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FROM ASHCROFT TO LARIOS :
RECENT REDISTRICTING LESSONS
FROM GEORGIA
Ronald Keith Gaddie * and Charles S. Bullock, III **

Redistricting is the most nakedly partisan activity in American
politics. The decennial activity of allocating political power results
in conflict among regional, partisan, racial, and ethnic communities
of interest.1 Political science research generally acknowledges that
when one party completely controls the redistricting process it will
perpetuate its majority even if doing so unfairly disadvantages the
minority party.2 Tendencies toward political excess are most likely
to be deterred when redistricting is done by (1) a non-partisan
commission; (2) a divided government, forcing bipartisan cooperation; or (3) the judiciary, working with third-party, neutral
mapmakers to check majority excesses.3
* Professor of Political Science, Department of Political Science, The University
of Oklahoma. We thank the editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for inviting
our submission, and for their comments and help in preparation in finalizing the Article. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New Orleans, LA, January 5-9, 2005. We thank
Alan Abramowitz, Bruce I. Oppenheimer, and Richard Forgette for their comments
and suggestions, though they bear no responsibility for the opinions or interpretation
contained herein.
** Richard B. Russell Professor of Political Science and Josiah Meigs Distinguished Teaching Professor, Department of Political Science, The University of
Georgia.
1. See generally DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION (1999);
MARK E. RUSH, DOES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE? PARTISAN REPRESENTATION AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR (1993) (discussing the gerrymandering controversy). But see generally Kevin A. Hill, Does the Creation of Majority Black Districts
Aid Republicans? An Analysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections in Eight Southern
States, 57 J. POL. 384 (1995) (arguing that the creation of majority-black electoral
districts in the south aids Republicans); L. Marvin Overby & Kenneth M. Cosgrove,
Unintended Consequences? Racial Redistricting and the Representation of Minority
Interests, 58 J. POL. 540 (1996) (arguing that “packing” minority constituents into
“majority-minority” districts results in representatives becoming less sensitive to the
concerns of the black community).
2. See, e.g., Alan A. Abramowitz, Partisan Redistricting and the 1982 Congressional Elections, 45 J. POL. 767, 770 (1983).
3. See BRUCE CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 2-4 (1984) (discussing all
three methods); see also DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 113–14, 145-48 (1992)
(discussing the role of the judiciary and non-partisan redistricting bodies). But see
Richard G. Niemi & Alan A. Abramowitz, Partisan Redistricting and the 1992 Con-
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The 2001 Georgia redistricting was a blatant exercise of power
by a political majority bent on self-perpetuation.4 By the mid1990s, Democrats had ceased to attract a majority of the votes for
state legislators, yet they continued to win a majority of seats in
both chambers.5 When confronted with the need to redistrict,
Democrats sought not simply to hold their own but to increase
their share of the seats. The redistricting led to two judicial challenges, two trips to the U.S. Supreme Court,6 a modification of the
non-retrogression standard of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
by the United States Supreme Court,7 and, ultimately, invalidation
of the districts for violating the one-person, one-vote principle.8
In Larios v. Cox, the court implemented a replacement map
crafted by a special master named by the three-judge panel.9 The
court largely ignored political factors in deference to traditional redistricting principles and on April 14, 2004, produced a map with
population deviations of less than +/-1%.10 After the implementation of this politically-neutral plan, the Democratic party lost control of the Georgia House of Representatives for the first time
gressional Elections, 56 J. POL. 813 (1994) (discussing the effects of partisan control of
state government on partisan gains from redistricting).
4. See David Pendered, Senate Passes Redrawn Districts, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Aug. 11, 2001, at A1 [hereinafter Pendered, Redrawn Districts].
5. Charles S. Bullock, III, Georgia: Still the Most Democratic State in the South?,
in THE NEW POLITICS OF THE OLD SOUTH 53, 65 (Charles S. Bullock, III & Mark J.
Rozell eds., 2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter Bullock, Still the Most Democratic State in the
South?].
6. See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461
(2003).
7. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 479-85 (interpreting Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting
Rights Act to uphold Georgia’s actions).
8. See Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1322 (N.D. Ga. 2004). Georgia has
had some of its legislative districts overturned by federal courts in each of the last two
decades. In the 1990s, two of the state’s congressional districts were rejected due to
race-based gerrymandering in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). More recently,
state legislative districts were struck down for population violations in Larios, 300 F.
Supp. 2d 1320. See generally Charles S. Bullock, III, Two Generations of Redistricting:
An Overview, EXTENSIONS (Fall 2004), available at http://www.ou.edu/special/albertctr/extensions/fall2004/Bullock.html.
9. See Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1358; see also Rhonda Cook, Legislature 2004:
Reprieve for Some; Races Among Colleagues Are Reduced, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar.
25, 2004, at E4; Rhonda Cook, Maps Ready, Parties Set to Fight, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Mar. 26, 2004, at A1.
10. See Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1349. Court-crafted maps are held to a de minimus standard for population deviations—as small as is reasonably possible. No bright
line figure exists for this determination, but because the central constitutional defect
of the maps in this litigation was population deviations, the very small deviations of
the court’s remedy are worth noting. See infra text accompanying notes 335-336.
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since Reconstruction.11 Statistical patterns present in the 2002 legislative elections, when applied to the demographic and structural
changes in the new districts, projected a Republican majority with
a shift in the expected partisan majority between ten and thirteen
districts.12 In actuality Republicans gained far more seats, and only
about half of the seats changing hands can be attributed to the
remap.13 The remap demonstrates the potential consequences of
undoing a partisan gerrymander and helps define the limitations
enunciated by the courts regarding their ability to recognize and
undo partisan gerrymanders.
In this Article, we explore the impact of a court-ordered and implemented re-crafting of state legislative districts in the state of
Georgia. First, we explore the notion of “fairness” in legislative
redistricting and identify the factors associated with a “fair” map.
We then describe the partisan nature of the 2001 Georgia state legislative redistricting and the political consequences of this most effective gerrymander. We also describe the two legal challenges to
the Georgia maps—Georgia v. Ashcroft and Larios v. Cox—and
discuss the path of both cases to the U.S. Supreme Court. We then
explore the expected and observed consequences of the Court-ordered and implemented redistricting that undid the unconstitutional Georgia gerrymander, and draw conclusions regarding the
prospect for how court remedies can affect partisan bias in redistricting plans.
WHAT ARE “FAIR” LEGISLATIVE MAPS?
The controversies arising in redistricting relate to a pair of primary questions: what are the motives of the map-maker, and how
do these motives affect the “fairness” of a map? These questions
are difficult to address because the notion of fairness is arbitrary
and relative.14 The term “gerrymander” means to craft legislative
11. See Charles S. Bullock, III, Georgia: The GOP Finally Takes Over, in THE
NEW POLITICS OF THE OLD SOUTH 49, 51 (Charles S. Bullock, III & Mark J. Rozell
eds., 3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter Bullock, GOP Finally Takes Over].
12. The analytic foundation for this statement appears in tbl. 7, infra.
13. A remap is the act of re-crafting legislative districts; remaps usually occur only
every ten years, after the census, or in order to correct a legal defect in the existing
maps that must be corrected.
14. For an overview of these issues, see CAIN, supra note 3, at 74-77; RUSH, supra
note 1, at 59-63; see generally MARK E. RUSH & RICHARD L. ENGSTROM, FAIR AND
EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION? DEBATING ELECTORAL REFORM AND MINORITY
RIGHTS (2001).
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boundaries for political advantage.15 In popular parlance, contorted, oddly-shaped districts resembling mythical beasts, windshield-splattered bugs, or elongated barbells are considered to
indicate something facially “unfair.”16 Districts of conventional geometric shape, such as squares, rectangles, and hexagons, are less
questionable.17 It is also possible to gerrymander for advantage
without violating compactness and using normal shapes, but to do
so is far from easy and likely leads to some waste relative to the
goals of those who gerrymander.18 The Georgia redistricting of
2001 raised all of these questions, as legislative districts became less
compact, less respectful of political subdivisions, stretched notions
of contiguity, and tested the limits of population inequality.19
Population Equality
Once the judiciary decided to ignore Justice Frankfurter’s admonition to avoid the political thicket and not interfere with legislative decisions allocation,20 the courts’ initial concern focused on
differences in the numbers of residents per district.21 Courts interpreted the Equal Protection Clause and Article I of the U.S. Constitution to require that all collegial bodies that chose
representatives from districts equalize the population among their
districts.22 Karcher v. Daggett reiterated the standard for population variations in congressional districts, stating, “absolute population equality [must] be the paramount objective of apportionment
15. While this is a commonly-accepted definition, it can be found in WEBSTER’S
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1987).
16. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995); Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F.
Supp. 408, 431 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 (W.D. La.
1993), vacated, 512 U.S. 1230 (1994).
17. See Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harm, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearance After Shaw v.
Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 549 (1993) (stating that districts may be judged by the
“regularity or length of their perimeters”).
18. See generally Richard G. Niemi et al., Measuring Compactness and the Role of
Compactness Standards in a Test for Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering, 52 J. POL.
1155 (1990); see also generally Micah Altman, Traditional Redistricting Principles: Judicial Myths v. Reality, 22 SOC. SCI. HIST. 159, 163-66 (1998).
19. See Tom Baxter, Democrats’ Map Draws GOP Venom, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Aug. 7, 2004, at B8; Pendered, Redrawn Districts, supra note 4, at A6; David
Pendered, Senate Remap Vote Set Today, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 8, 2004, at B4.
20. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (holding a challenge to population inequality among districts non-justiciable).
21. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206 (1962) (finding a Tennessee challenge to
population differences among districts justiciable).
22. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 (1969); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1 (1964).
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[because] the command of Art. I, § 2 as regards the national legislature outweighs the local interests that a State may deem relevant
in apportioning districts for representatives to state and local legislatures.”23 Ultimately, the Supreme Court signaled that state legislative plans that limited the range in population across their
districts to no more than 10% were presumed to comply with the
equal population requirement.24
Dilution of Minority Political Influence
After population equality, the second most important requirement when assessing districting plans is that they not dilute minority political influence. Georgia, along with Alabama, Louisiana,
Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, about half of North Carolina,
and parts of eight other states must prove the racial fairness of
their districting plans as a result of being subject to Section 5 of the
1965 Voting Rights Act.25 This legislation and its subsequent
amendments require jurisdictions with low levels of participation in
the 1960s and 1970s to submit all legislation that changes election
laws or procedures to either the Attorney General of the United
States or the district court of the District of Columbia for review
and approval before implementation (“preclearance”).26 Districting plans are among the types of legislative changes requiring federal approval.27 The initial legislation sought to protect AfricanAmericans, but the 1975 amendments expanded preclearance requirements to linguistic minorities such as Latinos, Native Americans, and Asian Americans.28
Districting plans in jurisdictions not subject to the preclearance
provision of the Voting Rights Act may be challenged by minorities
who believe that their political influence has been diluted, or by
23. See 462 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1983).
24. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993) (stating that a maximum
deviation of 10% is a minor one); Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983)
(same).
25. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, tit. I, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439.
Subsequent revisions of Section 4 of the statute extended coverage to Alaska, Arizona, Texas, and parts of Florida, South Dakota, New Hampshire, Michigan, California, and New York. Pub. L. No. 94-73, tit. 2, § 206, 89 Stat. 400 (1975).
26. § 5, 79 Stat. 439.
27. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (prohibiting a state from
enacting “any voting qualification” not in force before November 1, 1964 without first
submitting the change for preclearance review).
28. § 206, 89 Stat. 402; see generally ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES
COUNT? (1987).
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the U.S. Attorney General.29 The preclearance provision of Section 5 applies to only 16 states; the entire nation is subject to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as amended in 1982.30
The standard applied by federal authorities in the course of
preclearance has been non-retrogression.31 For most of the time
since its inception, non-retrogression has barred new maps that reduce the number of districts in which a protected minority constituted a majority of the population. A second application forbade
reducing the minority population percentage in districts in which
they constituted a majority.32 This has allowed federal authorities
to ensure that concentrations of minority group members not be
dispersed in the course of redistricting.33
Continuity of Representation
Several additional factors may be considered in the course of
drawing new districts, although these are afforded less significance
than equal population and the fair treatment of minorities.34 An
additional consideration has been the treatment of incumbents and
their constituencies, with attention specifically on questions of political or partisan fairness.35 The treatment of incumbents usually
focuses on three aspects:
(1) Continuity of representation: what proportion of an incumbent’s new constituency comes from the old constituency, i.e. does
the new map retain the core of the old district?36

29. § 5, 79 Stat. 439.
30. Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131 (1982).
31. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320 (2000);
Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
32. This requirement was most recently reaffirmed in League of United Latin
American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006). The oddity of this decision is that most believed that a district which performed for minority voters (Texas
congressional district 25) was implicitly overturned in order to reconstitute a district
that could potentially perform for minority voters but did not (Texas congressional
district 23), ostensibly because it was less compact. Id. at 2626. But, an even lesscompact minority district that performed was retained in the map as legal (Texas congressional district 15). Id. at 2656 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
33. See Beer, 425 U.S. at 130.
34. See Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 39 (1982) (per curiam).
35. See Good v. Austin, 800 F. Supp. 557, 567 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
36. See White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 790 (1973) (discussing state interest in preserving “constituency-representative relations”).
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(2) Political balance and continuity of the reelection constituency: how does the partisanship of the new district compare to the
old district?37
(3) Pairings: are incumbents paired so they must run against
each other? Are the pairings competitive? Are they party-neutral
or do the pairings advantage one party over the other?38
On the other hand, protection of incumbents is a traditional districting principle that a legislature may consider.39 Incumbent protection is limited to the extent that it must give way in the face of
higher priorities that have been recognized by courts—equal population and equitable treatment of minorities.40 In assessing the fairness of maps, biased treatment of incumbents by region or party
can be important. Treatment of incumbents may indicate a general
partisan bias in map design. When changes in party competitiveness, core retention, and incumbent pairing fall disproportionately
and detrimentally on incumbents of one party, and are not a product of the pursuit of population equality, racial fairness, or other
traditional redistricting principles, this can constitute evidence of
partisan gerrymandering.41 Thus, incumbency may be subordinated to other redistricting principles.
Partisan Fairness
Of all the fairness concerns in redistricting, none has proven
more elusive than partisan fairness. Representative political systems rest on a presumption that preferences will be efficiently
translated into government, and, more specifically, that majority
preferences will translate into majority government. The earliest
successful challenges to malapportioned legislatures came in the
37. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 735 (1973) (holding interest in “political balancing” not to be an infirmity to an otherwise constitutional redistricting plan).
38. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740 (1983).
39. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 964 (1996). Incumbent protection must be
consistent and neutral. See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 845-46 (1983).
40. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) (discussing traditional principles
and their subordination); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153 (1993) (same).
41. See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 949 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The
district court correctly held that the drafters’ desire to give an electoral advantage
to . . . certain incumbents . . . did not justify the conceded deviations from the principle of one person, one vote.”); see also LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2636 n.5
(2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (describing “regional
favoritism” and “discriminatory protection of . . . incumbents” as impermissible
factors).
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one-party states of Tennessee, Alabama, and Georgia.42 While the
motivation for these suits was not partisan, the notion that a system
of fair representation should not disfranchise the majority to benefit a geographic minority assumed a new place in constitutional
law.
Partisan fairness has gained little traction in the courts as a factor
for evaluating gerrymanders. A majority of the Supreme Court appears to believe that partisan gerrymanders are justiciable, but the
court has never enunciated a standard that a plaintiff has been able
to meet. Most recently in the case of Vieth v. Jubelirer, congressional redistricting in Pennsylvania gave the Court an opportunity
to revisit issues of partisan fairness. Pennsylvania’s Republicancontrolled state legislature and governor implemented a congressional map that resulted in Republican advantage across numerous
more districts. Litigation made its way to the Supreme Court,
which indicated that a constitutional standard has not been obtained by those who seek to eliminate partisan bias in district
designs.43
The Supreme Court, in Davis v. Bandemer, held that partisan
gerrymanders were illegal only if they precluded all hope of success
and all input by the minority party into the political process, a standard so impossibly high that no redistricting product has been invalidated.44 Indeed, partisan unfairness is recognized as a reason
for crafting constituencies that might otherwise be seen as illegal
racial gerrymanders. In Easley v. Cromartie, the Supreme Court
found no violation of the Equal Protection Clause in an alleged
racial gerrymander because partisanship was as good an explanation as race for the shape of the challenged congressional district.45
When re-drawing electoral maps, courts take partisan fairness
into consideration. When forced to correct defective maps, courts
have taken pains to avoid advantaging one political party, lest the
court be guilty of gerrymandering.46 These same courts have asserted, however, that because their job is to remedy legal defects
42. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 349 (C.D. Tenn. 1962) (reviewing state
legislative redistricting plan on remand from U.S. Supreme Court).
43. See LULAC, 126 S. Ct. at 2607 (remarking on the lack of a manageable, recognizable standard for observing and adjudicating partisan gerrymanders); Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271 (2004) (plurality opinion).
44. 478 U.S. 109, 132-33 (1986) (plurality opinion).
45. 532 U.S. 234, 243-44 (2001).
46. Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 90 (1997) (“[T]he trial court acted well within
its discretion in deciding it could not draw two majority-black districts without itself
engaging in racial gerrymandering.”); Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 41-42 (1982)
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rather than to correct political defects, they will make no proactive
effort to undo political bias in previously legal maps.47 Rather,
when courts have to draw maps after a legislature fails to discharge
this responsibility, each court uses as its starting point the last legal
map for the jurisdiction, and the court-prepared maps aspire to
partisan neutrality.48
GEORGIA REDISTRICTING 2001: DEMOCRATS’ LAST STAND
Georgia Democrats entered the 2001 redistricting process confronting unprecedented challenges. For the first time since immediately after the Civil War, they faced the possibility of losing
control of the legislature.49 For the better part of a decade, Democratic support among white voters had eroded, changing Georgia
from a state completely dominated by Democrats to a competitive
one.50 During the 1990s, Democrats lost their majority in the
state’s congressional delegation.51 When struggling to secure Department of Justice (“DOJ”) approval of a congressional plan in
the early 1990s, Democrats held all but one of the ten congressional seats.52 By 1995, Republicans filled eight of the enlarged
delegation’s eleven seats. Republicans defeated Democrats in
seven contests, while picking up an eighth seat when Rep. Nathan
Deal changed parties.53 With Deal’s conversion, Georgia’s delegation consisted of eight white Republicans and three African-American Democrats.54
(per curiam) (directing judicial deference to state policy goals in the reapportionment
arena).
47. In Balderas v. State, No. Civ. A. 6:01CV158, 2001 WL 34104836, at *2 (E.D.
Tex. Nov. 28, 2001), the court’s remap applied a check to ensure that the effort to
keep the court’s thumb off the (political) scale was more than an illusion. This effort
retained some residual elements of the 1991 Democratic gerrymander, because the
focus of the corrections, according to the court, was to maintain existing minority
opportunities, place the new seats gained by Texas, and otherwise minimize their impact on the map when equalizing district populations. Id.
48. Abrams, 521 U.S. at 96-97.
49. Bullock, Still the Most Democratic State in the South?, supra note 5, at 67-70;
Affidavit of Linda Meggers at 17-19, Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga.
2004) (03-CV-0693), 2003 WL 24226520.
50. Bullock, Still the Most Democratic State in the South?, supra note 5, at 60–65.
51. Id.
52. MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1992, at 304-25 (1991).
53. Charles S. Bullock, III, Georgia: Election Rules and Partisan Conflict, in THE
NEW POLITICS OF THE OLD SOUTH 54-55 (Charles S. Bullock, III & Mark J. Rozell
eds., 1st ed. 1998).
54. Id. at 59.
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For the first time in more than a century, Republicans won three
of the state’s statewide constitutional offices, retaining two of those
offices in 2001.55 Republicans also won a majority of the five-person Public Service Commission (“PSC”).56 In 1991 Republicans
held 35 of the 180 state House seats and 11 of the 56 state Senate
seats.57 A decade later Republicans controlled 74 House and 24
Senate seats.58
Democrats’ retention of majorities in both legislative chambers
owed much to the districting plan.59 Although they continued to
come up short in bids to take control of a chamber, GOP candidates consistently won majorities of the legislative votes cast statewide (the aggregation of all votes cast for all candidates, by party,
across all districts).60 As shown in Table 1, after the General Assembly adopted new districts in 1996, Republicans won 52% of the
statewide vote for senators.61 This marked the first time the GOP
polled a majority of the ballots cast for all legislative seats in the
Senate, but this breakthrough gave them only one more seat, leaving them with less than 40% of the chamber.62 In 2000, the Republicans’ top priority was to win a Senate majority in order to thwart
gerrymandering by Democrats.63 The GOP boosted its vote share
to 55% but got only 45% of the seats.64
The pattern for the House in Table 1 is similar to that of the
Senate. Even though the GOP won the bulk of the vote, it managed to win barely 40% of the seats.65 In the election that chose
the members who would redraw the House in 2001, Republicans
won 42% of the seats with 52% of the vote.66 Republican inability
to win control of a legislative chamber, despite taking the bulk of
the vote, contradicted the usual pattern for single-member systems
55. Id. at 61-64.
56. Matthew C. Quinn, Public Service Commission: Republicans on Cusp of 4-1
Edge, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 7, 2002, at D6.
57. Bullock, Still the Most Democratic State in the South?, supra note 5, at 55.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 65.
60. See infra data in tbl. 1.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see Bullock, Still the Most Democratic State in the South?, supra note 5, at
55.
63. Dave Williams, Parties Staking Claim on Valuable Seats in General Assembly,
ATHENS BANNER HERALD, Oct. 2, 2000, at B1; Interview with Eric Johnson, Georgia
State Senate Minority Leader, in Atlanta, Ga. (Oct. 19, 2000).
64. Bullock, Still the Most Democratic State in the South?, supra note 5, at 65.
65. See infra tbl. 1.
66. Id.; see also Bullock, Still the Most Democratic State in the South?, supra note
5, at 55.
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TABLE 1: REPUBLICAN SHARES OF VOTES AND
SEATS IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS
(ALL NUMBERS ARE PERCENTAGES)
SENATE
Votes
Seats
1992
40
27
1994
45
38
Redistricting of both chambers
1996
52
39
1998
51
39
2000
55
43
Redistricting of both chambers
2002
55
46
Redistricting of both chambers
2004
57
61

HOUSE
Votes
—
—

Seats
29
37

51
53
52

41
43
42

52

41

57

53

Source: Computed by authors from official election returns. See Georgia Secretary of State,
Georgia Election Returns, available at www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/election_returns/default.
htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).

like that used in Georgia during the 1990s.67 The principle, well
recognized for a century, that the majority party gets a bonus in
seats, has sometimes been referred to as the “cube law of
politics.”68
But just the opposite was happening in Georgia. Demographic
shifts during the 1990s compounded the challenges confronting
Democrats. The suburban areas experiencing the most rapid
growth tended to vote Republican.69 The 2000 census showed the
Columbus, Savannah, and Augusta areas each had approximately
one more representative than their population would justify.70 The
67. Cf. DOUGLAS RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS 27
(1967) (discussing calculation of electoral votes).
68. See generally Andrew Gelman & Gary King, Enhancing Democracy Through
Legislative Redistricting, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 541, 543 (1994); M. G. Kendall & A.
Stuart, The Law of the Cubic Proportion in Election Results, BRITISH J. SOC. 183, 183
(1950). But see Edward Tufte, The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party
Systems, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 540, 540-547 (1973).
69. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (“[T]he fastestgrowing counties in the state over the past decade are Republican-leaning.”); see also
Expert Report of Ronald K. Gaddie at 7, Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D.
Ga 2004) (No. 03-CV-0693) [hereinafter Gaddie Expert Report] (supporting
plaintiff).
70. The ideal population is the state’s population divided by the number of seats in
a chamber. The 2000 census recorded Georgia’s total population as 8,186,453, and
there are 180 seats in the Georgia House of Representatives, which indicates an ideal
population of 45,480 people per Representative. See U.S. Census Bureau, Georgia by
County 2000, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=n&_lang=en&mt_
name=DEC_2000_PL_U_GCTPL_ST2&format=ST-2&_box_head_nbr=GCT-PL&ds
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populations of Macon, Albany, and the combination of DeKalb
and Rockdale Counties east of Atlanta each came up short of the
one person, one vote standard by about three-fourths of a representative.71 On the other hand, the population of suburban counties where Republicans have prospered were under-represented.
For example, the 2000 population entitled Cobb County northwest
of Atlanta to an additional House seat while the combination of
suburban Gwinnett and Forsyth Counties on the northeast side was
under-represented by approximately four seats.72
The House seats held by African-Americans at the time of the
2000 census were under-populated by a quarter of a million peo-

_name=DEC_2000_PL_U&geo_id=04000US13 (last visited Apr. 16, 2007) [hereinafter Georgia County Census Data]. In 2000, the counties in which Columbus, Savannah, and Augusta are located had populations of 186,291 (Muscogee County), 232,048
(Chatham County), and 199,775 (Richmond County), respectively. See id. These
populations entitled Columbus to four seats, Savannah to five seats, and Augusta to
four seats. At the time of the 2000 census, Columbus constituted the bulk of five
districts and part of a sixth, Savannah had six House seats, and Augusta had four
districts and large parts of two others. Compare Georgia Representative Districts,
Carl Vinson Inst. of Gov’t, Univ. of Georgia (1996), available at http://www.cviog.uga.
edu/Projects/gainfo/pdf/99house.pdf [hereinafter Pre-2000 Georgia Representative
District Map] (outlining districts), with Georgia Metropolitan Statistical Areas Before
2003, Carl Vinson Inst. of Gov’t, Univ. of Georgia (2002), available at http://www.
cviog.uga.edu/Projects/gainfo/pdf/msa2002map.pdf [hereinafter Pre-2003 Metropolitan Statistical Areas Map] (highlighting greater Columbus, Savannah, and Augusta
metropolitan areas).
71. The 2000 population of Bibb County, where Macon is located, was 153,887;
Dougherty County, where Albany is located, had a population of 96,065. Georgia
County Census Data, supra note 70. DeKalb and Rockdale counties had a combined
population of 735,976. Id. The population of Macon entitled it to 3.4 House members; Albany’s population entitled it to two members. The combined populations of
DeKalb and Rockdale Counties justified 16.2 representatives. At the time of the census, Macon had four House seats and part of a fifth. Compare Pre-2000 Georgia Representative District Map, supra note 70, with Pre-2003 Metropolitan Statistical Areas
Map, supra note 70. Albany had two representatives and provided 75% of the population for a third district. Id. DeKalb and Rockdale Counties accounted for 17 seats.
Id.
72. In 2000, Cobb County’s population of 607,701 entitled it to 13.4 seats. See
Georgia County Census Data, supra note 70. Its delegation before the 2000 elections
had eleven Republicans and one Democrat. See Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia
State House of Representatives 1998 Election Results, Nov. 3, 1998, http://www.sos.
state.ga.us/elections/election_results/1998_1103/house.htm [hereinafter Georgia State
House 1998 Election Results]. Atlanta Democrat Don Wix represented two Cobb
precincts in District 33. See id. Gwinnett and Forsyth Counties had a total population
of 686,855, which justified 15 House seats. Georgia County Census Data, supra note
70. The representatives for these counties consisted of 11 Republicans and one Democrat, with two legislators representing parts of counties other than Gwinnett or Forsyth. Georgia State House 1998 Election Results, supra.
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ple.73 This would translate into 5.5 seats. The seats held by white
Democrats at the time of the census were under-populated by a
combined 3.6 seats.74 If the redistricting plan had simply reallocated seats so as to reflect the current incumbents in the seats,
Republicans might have picked up nine seats. The Georgia House
of Representatives has 180 members, while the Georgia Senate has
56 members. With nine additional seats, Republicans would have
come close to half the membership in the House, reaching 87 seats.
In the Senate, 12 of 13 majority-black districts were under-populated as of 2000.75 The sum of the population in these districts
could justify only ten districts.76 The population in the districts
held by white Democrats also came up one seat short of what
would be required under one person, one vote.77 On the other
hand, the 24 districts represented by Republicans had the population that would justify 27 seats—one short of half the 56-person
chamber.78 One heavily Republican Senate district had twice the
ideal population.79 These figures suggest that redistributing the
population across the existing Senate districts to eliminate deviations could bring the GOP right to the brink of a majority. Combining the recent electoral performances with the demographic
shifts indicate that the Democrats who controlled the process had
73. The 33 districts represented by African-Americans before the 2000 elections
had a total population of 1,250,743, sufficient for 27.5 seats. See GEORGIA LEGIS.
REAPPORTIONMENT OFFICE, GEORGIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISTRICTS
BEFORE REDISTRICTING (2000) [hereinafter GEORGIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
DISTRICTS BEFORE REDISTRICTING] (on file with authors). To justify 33 seats, the
districts should have had a population of 1,500,840.
74. The 69 districts represented by white Democrats in 2000 had a combined population of 2,973,606, sufficient for 65.4 seats. See Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia
State Representative Election Results, Nov. 3, 1998, http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/election_results/1998_1103/house.htm [hereinafter Georgia State House 1998
Election Results]; see also GEORGIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISTRICTS
BEFORE REDISTRICTING, supra note 73. To justify 69 districts, the combined population should have been 3,138,120.
75. GEORGIA LEGIS. REAPPORTIONMENT OFFICE, GEORGIA STATE SENATE DISTRICTS BEFORE REDISTRICTING (2000) [hereinafter GEORGIA SENATE DISTRICTS
BEFORE REDISTRICTING] (on file with authors).
76. The total population of these 13 districts was 1,589,921. Id.
77. See Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia State Senate Election Results, Nov. 3,
1998, http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/election_results/1998_1103/senate.htm
[hereinafter Georgia State Senate 1998 Election Results].
78. See id.; see also GEORGIA SENATE DISTRICTS BEFORE REDISTRICTING, supra
note 75.
79. District 48 had 311,367 people. See GEORGIA SENATE DISTRICTS BEFORE REDISTRICTING, supra note 75. The ideal population for a Senate district based on the
2000 census would be 146,187 people per Senator. See Georgia County Census Data,
supra note 70.
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little margin for error if they were to retain control of the
legislature.
Past governors had taken a hands-off approach to redistricting.80
Governor Roy Barnes broke with tradition, assuming a central role
in the 2001 map making, and made a particularly great impact on
the Senate map.81 In previous decades, much of the work of composing and tweaking maps to accommodate the concerns of powerful legislators took place in the Legislative Reapportionment
Office.82 In 2001 Senate maps were drawn under the watchful eye
of an out-of-state consultant.83 Democratic legislators were shown
how the map treated their districts, but even they did not get a
glimpse at the entire plan for the state.84
House Speaker Tom Murphy, who had often clashed with governors during his quarter century leading the chamber, insisted on
making changes to the Governor’s map.85 As the minority party,
Republicans had no input into the maps, but unlike in the past,
many Democratic legislators also had minimal input.86
The 2001 Plans
Democrats had to distribute their minority of the vote statewide
to maximum advantage to force Republicans to squander their
electoral advantage. As one step to maximize the influence of the
dwindling Democratic electorate, the House plan resurrected
multi-member districts (“MMDs”) that had been eliminated in
1992.87 In the new plan, MMDs contained just over one-third of
80. Rhonda Cook, Governor’s Part in Redistricting Upsets GOP, ATLANTA J.CONST., Aug. 3, 2001, at C3.
81. See Jim Galloway, Governor’s Redistricting Role Unique, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Oct. 1, 2001, at B1; Dick Pettys, Democrats, Barnes at Odds over Redistricting, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD, Aug. 3, 2001; Transcript of Trial Proceedings at 503-05, Larios
v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga 2004) (No. 03-CV-0693) (testimony of Sen.
Daniel W. Lee).
82. See Affidavit of Linda Meggers, supra note 49, at 2-10. The court in Johnson v.
Miller characterized Linda Meggers, head of the Legislative Reapportionment Office
from 1978-2001, as “probably the single most knowledgeable person available on the
subject of Georgian redistricting.” 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
83. Interview with David Sutton, Press Secretary to Ga. Lt. Gov. Mark Taylor, in
Atlanta, Ga. (Oct. 16, 2001).
84. Interview with Anne Lewis, Attorney, and Brian Tyson, Director of Policy &
Research, Georgia House Republican Caucus, in Atlanta, Ga. (Aug. 31, 2005).
85. Don Schanche, Jr., Redistricting Maps Kept Under Wraps, Macon Telegraph,
Aug. 3, 2001, at B1; see also Pettys, supra note 81.
86. Galloway, supra note 81, at B3.
87. See Charles S. Bullock, III & Ronald Keith Gaddie, Changing from Multi
Member to Single Member Districts: Partisan, Racial, and Gender Impacts, STATE &
LOCAL GOV’T REV., Fall 1993, at 155.
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the 180 legislators in the chamber.88 Several MMDs were designed
to defeat a Republican incumbent by swamping a concentration of
GOP voters in a part of the district with greater numbers of Democrats elsewhere in the district.89 For example, Henry County, one
of the nation’s fastest growing counties during the 1990s,90 had a
Republican representative. The new map placed the Republican in
a three-person district dominated by Democratic voters in southern DeKalb County.91 Once the Republican understood the impossible situation into which he had been placed, he aborted his
reelection bid.92 A four-person district was drawn to protect Atlanta Rep. Kathy Ashe, who had switched party affiliation from

88. See, e.g., Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia State House of Representatives
2002 Election Results, Nov. 5, 2002, available at http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/
eletion_results/2002_1105/house.htm [hereinafter Georgia State House 2002 Election
Results] (detailing results of MMD elections after redistricting); see also Ben Smith,
Multimember Districts Confusing, Challenging, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 23, 2002, at
A1.
89. Gaddie Expert Report, supra note 69 at 27-28.
90. Henry County is the fourth fastest-growing county in the United States. See
U.S. Census Bureau, Estimates for the 100 Fastest Growing U.S. Counties in 2003,
http://www.census.gov/popest/counties/CO-EST2003-09.html (showing 25.7% growth
in Henry County between 2000 and 2003).
91. Prior to the plan implemented in the 2002 election, House District 108 was
wholly in Henry County. See Pre-2000 Georgia Representative District Map, supra
note 70. With a population of 70,337, it exceeded the ideal House district population
by 54.7%. See GEORGIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISTRICTS BEFORE REDISTRICTING, supra note 73. Because Henry County had a population of 119,341 (circa
the 2000 census), it would have been appropriate to have two districts wholly within
the county, and most of a third. Instead, the new map split the county among four
districts: 59, 60, 84, and 85. See Carl Vinson Inst. of Gov’t, Univ. of Georgia, Georgia
Representative Districts Metro Area Detail Map, Effective 2002 Election (2002),
available at http://www.cviog.uga.edu/Projects/gainfo/pdf/gahouse2002b.pdf [hereinafter 2002 Representative Metro Area Detail Map]. Each of these four districts was an
MMD, so that Henry County was represented by a total of ten legislators. See Georgia State House 2002 Election Results, supra note 88 (listing results of all elections).
Had Henry been used as the base for two districts, this suburban county would likely
have elected two Republicans, because two-thirds of the county voted for George W.
Bush for president in 2000. Instead, 81% of the county’s population ended up represented by Democrats. While Henry County’s 2000 population was less than 15%
black, see Georgia County Census Data, supra note 70, 71,222 of its Republican-leaning whites were placed in two MMDs (Districts 59 and 60) dominated by DeKalb
County. These MMDs were more than 61% black and safely Democratic. See GEORGIA LEGIS. REAPPORTIONMENT OFFICE, GEORGIA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DISTRICTS AFTER REDISTRICTING (2002) (on file with authors) (furnishing figures that
demonstrate that 162,617 of the total 260,870 residents of Districts 59 and 60 were
black).
92. Kevin Duffy, District 60, State House: Redistricting Blamed in Decision to Quit
Race, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 2, 2002, at D8.
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Republican to Democrat.93 Had she sought reelection in her old
Single Member District (“SMD”), Republicans angered by her defection might have turned her out. The new district contained what
had been three Democratic districts, along with Rep. Ashe’s former district.94
A second Democratic strategy—used in both chambers—
overpopulated Republican districts while under-populating those
with histories of voting Democratic.95 If the districts had approached a normal distribution, there would be many districts
slightly over- or under-populated, with a few districts approaching
what are thought to be the allowable extremes of + 5% from the
ideal population.96 Half of the House districts had populations that
deviated by at least + 4% from the ideal population of 45,980.97 A
third of the districts had population deviations of + 4.5% and 20 of
the seats were in districts where the population was + 4.9%.98 Of
the 180 House seats, 11 were overpopulated by 4.9% or more while
nine were under-populated by a like amount.99 In subsequent litigation, a federal court concluded that
The other major cause of the deviations in both plans was an
intentional effort to allow incumbent Democrats to maintain or
increase their delegation, primarily by systematically underpopulating the districts held by incumbent Democrats, by
overpopulating those of Republicans, and by deliberately pairing numerous Republican incumbents against one another.100

Instead of a party-neutral distribution, Republicans were packed
into districts overpopulated by 4-5% while Democratic districts
were frequently under-populated by 4-5%.101 Of 107 districts won
by Democrats in 2002, 37 (34.9%) had population deviations of at
least 4%, but only 30 of the districts won by Democrats (28.3%)
93. Dick Pettys, Democrats Look to Protect Party-Switcher, ATHENS BANNERHERALD, June 29, 2001.
94. The district in question was State Representative District 42. See Georgia
State House 2002 Election Results, supra note 88.
95. Gaddie Expert Report, supra note 69, at 11.
96. See infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
97. Gaddie Expert Report, supra note 69, at 9.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1329 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
101. The practice of overpopulating Republican districts while under-populating
Democratic districts was not new to Georgia legislative districting. The proportion of
districts placed at the limits of the ten-point range, however, had increased with each
legislative redistricting since the 1980s, as Democrats strove to stall Republican
growth. Transcript of Trial Proceedings, supra note 81, at 79-80 (testimony of Ronald
K. Gaddie).
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had populations above the ideal, and only a dozen (11.3%) were
more than 4% above the ideal population.102 In contrast, Republican legislators were in 37 of 72 instances (50.7%) elected from districts overpopulated by at least four percent. More than threequarters of the most populous districts elected Republicans.103
The results of the 2002 legislative elections affirmed the goals of
the Democrats’ designs. Most seats won by Republicans in the
election subsequent to the redistricting in 2002 were overpopulated
by more than four percent. In contrast, just over 10% of the seats
won by Democrats were overpopulated by more than four percent.104 Ten of 72 Republican districts were overpopulated by at
least 4.9% compared with only one of the districts won by a Democrat.105 At the other extreme, only 5.5% of the Republican seats
were under-populated by 4% compared with 34.6% of the Democratic seats that were under-populated by more than four percent.106 Of the 39 seats held by African-Americans, 16 (41%) were
under-populated by at least four percent.107
Ten of the Senate districts won by Republicans in 2002 (38.5%)
had populations at least 4.9% above the ideal.108 Of 18 districts
overpopulated by at least 4.25%, all but two elected Republicans.109 Nineteen districts were under-populated by at least 4%
and all but two of these districts elected Democrats although two
of these soon switched to the GOP.110 The average population for
102. Gaddie Expert Report, supra note 69, at 29.
103. Id. at 29-30.
104. See Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia State Senate Election Results, Nov. 5,
2002, available at http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/election_results/2002_1105/senate.htm [hereinafter Georgia State Senate 2002 Election Results] (displaying those
districts won by Republicans); see also GEORGIA LEGIS. REAPPORTIONMENT OFFICE,
GEORGIA STATE SENATE DISRICTS AFTER REDISTRICTING (2002) (on file with authors) [hereinafter GEORGIA STATE SENATE DISTRICTS AFTER REDISTRICTING] (displaying which districts were over- and under-populated, and by what amounts).
105. See Georgia State Senate 2002 Election Results, supra note 104; see also
GEORGIA STATE SENATE DISTRICTS AFTER REDISTRICTING, supra note 104.
106. See Georgia State Senate 2002 Election Results, supra note 104; see also
GEORGIA STATE SENATE DISTRICTS AFTER REDISTRICTING, supra note 104.
107. See Georgia State Senate 2002 Election Results, supra note 104; see also
GEORGIA STATE SENATE DISTRICTS AFTER REDISTRICTING, supra note 104.
108. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1327 (N.D. Ga. 2004). Here the numerator is the 26 districts won by Republicans, exclusive of the four Democrats who
changed party immediately after the election. See Andy Peters & Charlie Lanter, Ray
Looking at Future GOP Switch: Representative from Peach Might Make Move in Two
Years, MACON TELEGRAPH, Dec. 20, 2002, at B1 (noting that State Senators Rooney
Brown, Don Cheeks, Jack Hill, and Dan Lee became Republicans shortly after the
elections).
109. See generally Gaddie Expert Report, supra note 69.
110. Id.
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the 26 districts that elected Republicans was + 2.5%, while the average district that elected an African-American was under-populated by four percent.111 The 20 districts that elected white
Democrats were under-populated by an average of 1.2 percent.
Four of six districts that elected white Democrats and which were
overpopulated by as much as 2% were also adjacent to heavily
black districts. The adjacent black districts were, on average,
under-populated by 4.4% as these loyal Democrats were distributed to bolster Democratic prospects in nearby districts.112 Only
five districts were + 1% of the ideal population.113
A third Democratic strategy paired Republican incumbents
while Democratic incumbents received separate districts in which
to run, or faced Republican incumbents before solidly Democratic
constituencies. A non-partisan plan would presumably have more
often paired Democrats whose districts needed to gain population,
while GOP incumbents would have usually avoided their neighbors
as their districts shed population.114 As Table 2 shows, nine House
districts housed two Republican incumbents while four districts
forced three Republicans to compete for just two seats.115 One
member at least would have to go. Another Republican found
himself in a two-seat, heavily black district, competing with two
Democratic incumbents.116 The net result was the elimination of
14 Republicans (19% of the caucus).117 Four SMDs paired a Democrat with a Republican, but to the dismay of the mapmakers,
Republicans won three of these contests.118 Only one new district
forced two Democrats to compete for a single seat.119 Sometimes a
district pairing Republican incumbents was adjacent to an open
seat in a district that tilted toward the GOP.120
The Senate plan paired three sets of Republicans and created
two other pairings consisting of one incumbent from each party.121
Democrats sought not just to replace Republicans with Democrats
but to reduce the ranks of experienced opponents,122 which ex111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1347-48 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
See infra tbl. 2.
Gaddie Expert Report, supra note 69, at 29-30.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29.
Id.
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TABLE 2: GEORGIA STATE HOUSE INCUMBENT PAIRINGS 2002
District*
3 (2 Post)
14 (2 Post)
17
30
35
44
46
52
61(3 Post)
67 (2 Post)
76
85 (2 Post)
97
106
110
113
126
127
137
138

Paired Incumbents
Hammontree (R), Williams (R), Forster (R)
Pinholster (R), C. Smith (R), Knox (R)
Scheid (R), Franklin (R)
Cooper (R), Kaye (R)
Wiles (R), Hines (R)
McKinney (D), Collins (R)
Snelling (R), Hembree (R)
Millar (R), Davis (R)
Ragas (D), Sailor (D), J. Williams (R)*
Mills (R), Coan (R), Reese (R)
Hudgens (R), B. Smith (R)
Cox (R), Yates (R), Lunsford (R)
Burmeister (R), Allen (D)
Graves (R), Reichert (D)
V. Smith (R), Roberts (R)
Hugley (D), Taylor (D)
Mueller (R), Day (R)
Lanier (R), DeLoach (I)
Everett (R), Bulloch (R)
Holland (D), Scott (R)

Pop.Dev. ’00 PSC
(%)
Average
4.740
61.80
3.990
51.04
4.820
71.25
4.570
70.47
4.990
64.13
−.680
36.26
4.240
60.46
2.000
61.62
−.740
31.56
4.950
69.58
−1.460
58.96
4.300
69.28
−4.290
34.11
4.470
60.32
.570
62.19
−3.680
24.76
4.790
68.57
4.800
51.79
4.450
61.31
3.100
46.55

• In “2 Post” districts, two seats were available; three seats were available in “3 Post” districts.
Source: Compiled from data in Expert report of Ronald K. Gaddie, supra note 67.

plains why some pairings occurred next to open seats likely to elect
a Republican.123 The pairing of Republican incumbents removed
51 years of legislative experience from the Senate that assembled
in 2003.124
As a consequence of packing of voters likely to vote Republican,
pairing Republican incumbents, and strategically allocating black
voters, legislative districts often split counties and assumed strange
shapes.125 At times packing Republican voters involved uniting
widely separated GOP enclaves in a single district. For example,
Senate District 51, originally in the suburbs north of Atlanta, had
been overpopulated by almost 21,000.126 Instead of contracting the
district, the new map transformed this district into a horseshoe
shape that extended from Atlanta’s northern suburbs to the state
123. Id.
124. Id. (“The direct result of these pairings was the elimination of four Republican
incumbents from the party’s caucus.”).
125. Tom Baxter, Democrats Following “Philosophy” in House, ATLANTA J.CONST., Aug. 14, 2001, at B4; Jim Wooten, Redistricting Fiasco Will Drive Campaign
Costs Through Roof, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 15, 2001, at A14.
126. See GEORGIA SENATE DISTRICTS BEFORE REDISTRICTING, supra note 75
(showing that District 51 had a population deviation of 20,982).
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line, and then ran along most of Georgia’s northern boundary over
to South Carolina, occupying the state’s northeastern corner.127
The 200-mile long district, which took almost eight hours to traverse, narrowed at one point to a width equal only to two football
fields.128 A similar contortion changed the form of the district represented by the Senate’s Republican leader Eric Johnson, who had
represented the Savannah suburbs located in two counties. In the
new map, Johnson’s district ran the entire length of Georgia’s
coast, stretching across parts of eight counties.129 In this example
of “duck contiguity” the district jumped from one barrier island to
the next while avoiding the mainland.130
An additional technique applied to the state legislative maps reduced the size of the black majorities in some districts in order to
redistribute reliable Democratic voters to tilt nearby marginal districts. African-Americans, presumed to be faithful voters for Democratic candidates,131 were reallocated to offset whites, most of
whom now voted Republican. This effectively packed white
Republicans into districts that had to be conceded, while strategically adding black votes to districts where they could provide the
margin of victory for white Democrats.132
The twelve majority-black Senate districts had an average black
voting age population (“VAP”) of 66.6% at the time of the 2000
127. See Carl Vinson Inst. of Gov’t, Univ. of Georgia, Georgia Senatorial Districts
Effective 2002 Election, available at http://www.cviog.uga.edu/Projects/gaininfo/pdf/ga
senate2002a.pdf [hereinafter 2002 Georgia State Senate District Map].
128. Jim Galloway, Redrawn District Takes All Day to Tour, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Aug. 11, 2001, at A6. The width of two football fields is 600 feet.
129. See 2002 Georgia State Senate District Map, supra note 127; see also David
Pendered, GOP Vows to Challenge Map Plan, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 7, 2001, at
B8. The counties that came within District 1 under the 2002 plan were Brantley,
Bryan, Camden, Chatham, Glynn, Liberty, McIntosh, and Pierce. See Counties
Within Georgia Senate Districts, Reapportionment Services Unit, Georgia General
Assembly (April 2002), available at http://ga2000.itos.uga.edu/redistricting/SenateBy
District.pdf.
130. The expression “duck contiguity” refers to those districts where one could not
traverse the district while staying on dry land, but a duck could go from one end to
the other; the court in Larios referred to this phenomenon as “water contiguity.” See
Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1332 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (referring, inter alia, to
Senator Johnson’s District 1).
131. Cf. Charles S. Bullock, III & Richard E. Dunn, The Demise of Racial Districting and the Future of Black Representation, 48 EMORY L. J. 1209, 1226-39 (1999)
(describing black voting patterns in Florida).
132. See Jim Galloway, Redistricting Expands White Base, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Aug. 16, 2001, at A1 [hereinafter Galloway, White Base]; see also Affidavit of Linda
Meggers, supra note 49, at 21.
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census.133 The 2001 plan reduced that average to 56.3 percent.134
Five districts emerged with VAPs that were less than 51.5% African-American.135 Before being redrawn four of these districts were
more than 60% black VAP136 and in the fifth, blacks had constituted 55.3% of the voting age population.137 Black leaders supported the redistribution of the black population in order to
advance Democratic candidates in 2001.138 Legislative Black Caucus (“LBC”) leaders accepted the governor’s explanation that this
was the price to pay, for the number of African-American committee chairs and greater legislative responsiveness to the policy concerns of black voters that followed from maintaining Democratic
dominance.139
THE FIRST CHALLENGE: ASHCROFT
Despite some Democrats’ unhappiness with the districts handed
to them by Governor Barnes, the Democratic party shoved the
Senate maps through over Republicans’ futile objections.140 Democrats did not accept Barnes’s proposals in their entirety, and also
imposed a Democratic gerrymander in the House.141 The primary
selling point was that the careful analysis of past voting patterns
indicated that these maps would continue to keep Republicans at
bay.142
Georgia has been subject to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
since 1965 and must get federal approval of redistricting plans
before implementation.143 Rather than sending the map to the
133. Charles S. Bullock, III & Ronald Keith Gaddie, Voting Rights Progress in
Georgia, N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming), at tbl. 8.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Direct Testimony of Charles Walker at 18-19, Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F.
Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. 01-2111); Jim Wooten, Secret Deals Silence Voices of
Many Voters, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 12, 2001, at C8.
139. See Galloway, White Base, supra note 132, at A14.
140. See Pendered, Redrawn Districts, supra note 4, at A6; Don Schanche, Jr.,
House Approves ‘Partisan’ Redistricting Map, MACON TELEGRAPH, Aug. 16, 2001, at
A1 [hereinafter Schanche, ‘Partisan’Map].
141. See Rhonda Cook, House Panel Approves New Map, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Aug. 14, 2001, at B1.
142. See id.; Bill Shipp, Dems Crow Now, But May Be Eating Crow in 2002, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD, Aug. 18, 2001, available at http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/
081901/opi_0819010005.shtml; see also Schanche, ‘Partisan’Map, supra note 140.
143. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, tit. I, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439;
see also supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
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U.S. Attorney General for review as it had in the past, Georgia
filed suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia seeking
a declaratory judgment that the maps did not discriminate against
minorities.144 The state presumably feared that the DOJ under the
Bush Administration might react negatively to its handiwork.
Georgia Democrats likely anticipated an advantage in taking a judicial, rather than administrative, route because they could predict
a greater likelihood of success with the DOJ as competing litigant,
rather than allowing the DOJ to reject the maps on its own. The
DOJ would have to compete as an equal adversary before the
courts, while under administrative review Georgia would have to
convince the agency that the maps were racially fair to achieve
preclearance.145 Republicans in the legislature objected to the
maps for reducing black concentrations in a number of districts, as
noted above.146
To the disappointment of Republicans, the DOJ raised no objections to the congressional or state House maps.147 The DOJ did,
however, find the reduction in the concentration of African-Americans in three Senate districts unsettling.148 In these districts, the
percentage of the black VAP dropped below 51 percent.149 Before
being redrawn, the black VAP in two of the districts exceeded
60%, and stood at 55% in the third.150 The DOJ contended that
the reduction in the black concentrations in these three districts
violated Section 5.151 Somewhat surprisingly, the DOJ did not oppose reductions in African-American concentrations in two other
Senate districts that dropped their African-American share of the
VAP to just above 50 percent. The DOJ distinguished between the
districts it accepted and those to which it objected on the grounds
that in the latter, the prospects for electing candidates preferred by
African-Americans had been compromised.152
144. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 25 (D.D.C. 2002); Hal Gulliver, Democrats Fret over Redistricting Case, BILL SHIPP’S GEORGIA, Mar. 4, 2002, at 2.
145. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973) (holding that any future
elections under the disputed reapportionment plan were to be enjoined, pending
Georgia’s compliance with federal approval requirements).
146. See supra notes 131-42 and accompanying text.
147. Bill Shipp, Will Redistricting Really Matter?, BILL SHIPP’S GEORGIA, Apr. 15,
2002, at 5 [hereinafter Shipp, Will Redistricting Really Matter?].
148. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 472 (2003).
149. See Bullock & Gaddie, supra note 133, at tbl. 8.
150. Id.
151. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 472.
152. Id.
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To justify reducing the black concentrations, Georgia offered the
analysis of Columbia University political scientist David Epstein.
Epstein presented probit models153 that estimated the percentage
of the black vote at which the candidate preferred by AfricanAmericans had a 50/50 probability of success—a point he estimated to be at 44.3% of the VAP.154 Epstein’s analysis provided a
foundation for the state to argue that districts in which black VAP
exceeded 50% should be acceptable, because there was a 75%
probability that those districts would elect the candidate preferred
by black voters.155 Critically, all but one of the African-American
senators approved of the creation of these “influence districts.”156
Had the Legislative Black Caucus opposed the reductions in black
concentrations, perhaps the DOJ might have objected to additional
districts, and perhaps have influenced the court’s assessment.
Although Georgia prevailed on most of its claims before the District of Columbia panel,157 the state appealed to the Supreme
Court. In a five to four decision, the Court reversed and remanded
to the district court for further consideration of the reduction in
black concentration in the three districts at issue.158 Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor, writing for the majority, found the testimony of
U.S. Representative John Lewis persuasive.159 Rep. Lewis, the
civil rights veteran, testified in favor of the reduction of black concentrations in the Senate plan, and explained that “‘giving real
power to black voters comes from the kind of redistricting efforts
the State of Georgia has made,’ and that the Senate plan ‘will give
real meaning to voting for African-Americans’ because ‘you have a
greater chance of putting in office people that are going to be
responsive.’”160
The Ashcroft decision took on immediate political significance in
Texas. Democrats in Texas, bracing for litigation against the com153. A probit model applies an inverse cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution to the general linear model. The estimator, instead of generating a
slope coefficient of the change in the value of an interval-level dependent variable,
instead estimates the prospect of obtaining one or the other outcome in a dichotomous dependent variable.
154. Expert Report of David Epstein at 8-16, Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461
(2003) (No. 1:01-CV-2111).
155. Id. at 16.
156. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 461.
157. Only three of the 249 districts submitted for approval failed. Shipp, Will Redistricting Really Matter?, supra note 147, at 5.
158. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 490-91.
159. Id. at 489.
160. Id.
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ing congressional redistricting, advanced an argument in July 2003
hearings before the Texas State Senate reapportionment committee that any district in Texas where minorities bloc-voted to elect a
Democrat constituted an Ashcroft-based coalition district, regardless of the size of the minority population.161 The particular target
of the redistricting, as alleged by Democrats, was the 24th congressional district of Rep. Martin Frost, Democratic caucus chair in the
U.S. House of Representatives; Frost’s district had no one majority
ethnic or racial bloc, but instead had a predominantly black, Democratic primary electorate and a predominantly white general election electorate with a largely non-voting 40% Hispanic population
in residence.162 In the subsequent preclearance process for the
Texas remap, the DOJ’s professional staff applied a broad-based
definition of the benchmark of minority electoral opportunity that
incorporated the concept of coalitional districts.163 The plaintiffs in
Sessions v. Perry, forerunner to the LULAC case, argued that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act necessitated drawing the coalition
districts, again drawing on the logic of the Ashcroft decision.164
The Texas district court did not accept this argument.165
THE SECOND CHALLENGE: ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE
Once the courts approved the new maps and rejected claims that
they diluted minority political influence in Georgia, the plaintiffs
raised two new challenges in Larios v. Cox.166 First, the Republicans claimed to be victims of an illegal partisan gerrymander.167
Second, they asserted that the new maps violated the one-person,
one-vote requirement which had been established by the Supreme
161. Redistricting Hearing, Dallas: Hearing Before the S. Jurisprudence Comm.,
2003 Leg., 78th Sess. 35-36 (Tex. 2003) (statement of Rep. Martin Frost) (discussing
reception of Ashcroft case); see also Ronald Keith Gaddie, The Texas Redistricting,
Measure for Measure, EXTENSIONS, Fall 2004, at 19, available at http://www.ou.edu/
special/albertctr/extensions/fall2004/Gaddie.html [hereinafter Gaddie Texas Redistricting] (discussing hearings).
162. Gaddie, Texas Redistricting, supra note 161, at 19.
163. Tim Mellett et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Section 5 Recommendation Memorandum (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/
documents/texasDOJmemo.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
164. Sessions v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 480 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
165. Id. at 481 (“Plaintiffs’ understandable efforts to freeze this ‘coalition’ by locating some duty under § 2 not to redraw the district is a transparent effort to use race as
a shield from a partisan gerrymander when the district itself was a child of identical
efforts to gerrymander.”).
166. Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004).
167. Id. at 1321-22.
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Court as a constitutional right in Baker v. Carr and Wesberry v.
Sanders, four decades earlier.168
The Larios panel dismissed the partisan gerrymandering claim
and focused exclusively on the population deviations.169 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Karcher v. Daggett has given an advantage
to congressional plans that have the smallest populations deviations.170 A number of states have sought to close off the possibility
of an equal-population challenge by reducing the deviations in
their plans to a single individual.171 Since Georgia’s plan had a total population deviation of seventy-two persons, it appeared vulnerable.172 In 2002, a federal district court had invalidated a
Pennsylvania congressional map prepared by Republicans, which
had a population range of seventeen people, in favor of the Democratic alternative that zeroed out the population differences.173
Courts had tolerated wider deviations in state and local legislative plans. Democrats who drafted Georgia’s plans presumed that
their plans would be acceptable if the total deviation did not exceed ten points (traditionally expressed as +/- 5%).174 Georgia had
scrupulously conformed to that standard.175 Nonetheless, almost a
third of the Georgia State Senate districts and more than one in ten
House districts had population deviations of + 4.9% or greater,
with some approaching + 4.99 percent.176
Although some courts have interpreted a ten-point range of
deviation as a safe harbor for districting plans,177 the Larios court
considered numbers within the range to create a rebuttable presumption of constitutionality.178 While the Supreme Court has not
interpreted the “one person, one vote” standard as requiring abso168. Id. See generally Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962).
169. Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1322. A three-judge panel is provided for by 28
U.S.C. § 2284(a) (1984).
170. 462 U.S. 725, 740-41 (1983).
171. Nineteen states report congressional maps with population deviations of one
person or less based on the 2000 census. See Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, Redistricting Population Deviation 2000, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/redistrict/
redistpopdev.htm.
172. See id.
173. Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 195 F. Supp. 2d 672 (M.D. Pa. 2002).
174. Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1341.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1327.
177. Id. at 1340 n.12 (citing Wright v. City of Albany, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1231 n.5
(M.D. Ga. 2003)).
178. Id. at 1340-41.
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lute population equality among state legislative districts, deviations
must be justified in terms of a legitimate state interest.179
The Larios court explored the state’s rationale offered to justify
the deviations in the three maps. Linda Meggers, the respected director of Georgia’s Legislative Reapportionment Office, testified
that it would be possible to zero out population differences in the
congressional plan while splitting fewer counties and precincts and
creating more compact districts.180 Despite Meggers’s testimony,
Georgia contended that any efforts to reduce population deviations would necessitate additional precinct splits, and that congressional boundaries in some of the divided precincts would not be
easily recognizable.181 The court accepted that justification as a legitimate state interest.182
The court found Georgia’s explanations for the population variations in the legislative plans less convincing. Witnesses for the state
acknowledged that in crafting these plans, Georgia had not considered traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, adherence to county boundaries, or maintenance of
communities of interest.183 Instead, the most over- or under-populated districts were often the ones that were the least compact and
strained to achieve contiguity.184 Six House districts and 17 Senate
districts had “duck contiguity,” with the disparate parts linked
across bodies of water not linked by bridges or causeways.185 Another five House districts and one Senate district could be considered to be contiguous only at a touch-point.186 The rationale for
stretching the concept of contiguity was not justified by promoting
population equality, as two of the touch-point districts were at least
4.5% off of the ideal population.187 Nor could it be argued that the
population deviations resulted from efforts to honor county bound-

179. Id. at 1339 (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964)).
180. Id. at 1335.
181. Id. at 1336.
182. Id. at 1356.
183. Id. at 1349-50.
184. Id. at 1350.
185. Id. at 1332; Gaddie Expert Report, supra note 67, at 16.
186. Touch-point contiguity means that two districts are contiguous only in the
sense that the diagonal black squares on a checkerboard are contiguous. See Larios,
300 F. Supp. 2d at 1332.
187. Id. (stating that “the majority of the districts that are contiguous only by reason of water or touch-point contiguity are overpopulated”) .
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aries.188 The House plan split 80 counties, eight more than in the
plan that it replaced.189 The Senate plan split 81 counties.190
Georgia offered three state interests to justify the redistricting:
(1) to protect the interests of rural South Georgia, which for decades had grown more slowly than the rest of the state by eliminating as few districts in that region as possible;191
(2) to protect inner-city Atlanta by reducing the number of districts it would lose;192
(3) to protect Democratic incumbents who participated in the
redistricting process.193
The plaintiffs questioned the validity of these interests. One
plaintiffs’ expert’s report articulated:
The conclusion to be drawn from this remap is a simple one,
summed up in an anonymous quote regarding Georgia’s county
unit system, published in 1961: “the situation is simply this:
we’ve got the power and you haven’t, and we ain’t going to give
it up!”
The crafting of legislative districts in Georgia has defied nearly
every convention of redistricting and subverted every traditional
redistricting principle. Why? Every redistricting principle—incumbent protection, compactness, contiguity, core retention,
county integrity—is subverted to plans with large population deviations, and which under-populate many districts while
overpopulating many others in an arbitrary fashion, based on
geography and politics. The deviations are not justified by any
traditional redistricting criterion.194

The court found that Georgia’s rationales for population deviations were not legitimate state interests.195 Instead, the efforts to
advantage certain parts of the state—rural South Georgia and inner-city Atlanta—were as unconstitutional as the efforts struck
down forty years earlier in Reynolds v. Sims.196 The Larios court
concluded that:
188. Id. at 1333.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1328.
192. Id. at 1328 n.3.
193. Id. at 1329.
194. Gaddie Expert Report, supra note 69, at 31 (quoting William G. Cornelius,
The County Unit System of Georgia: Facts and Prospects, 14 W. POL. Q. 942 (1961)).
195. Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1341-42.
196. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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In short, the deliberate regional favoritism built into the Georgia House and Senate Plans created more than a taint of arbitrariness and discrimination, violating Equal Protection by
diluting the votes of citizens of the suburban and exurban party
of northern Georgia and overweighing the votes of citizens in
rural Georgia and inner-city Atlanta.197

While protecting incumbents may be an acceptable state interest,
the Larios court noted that it “is a permissible cause of population
deviations only when it is limited to the avoidance of contests between incumbents and is applied in a consistent and nondiscriminatory manner.”198 The 2000 census had shown Republican districts
to be the most overpopulated, yet the new maps combined parts of
overpopulated Republican districts, pairing GOP incumbents in
districts that pushed the Equal Population envelope.199 In contrast,
Democratic districts that were under-populated had people added
to those districts, and the result was achieved without placing the
residences of multiple Democrats within the same district. Some
districts had to be torturously shaped to avoid having the district
boundaries encompass the homes of multiple Democratic
incumbents.
The best evidence of the Georgia legislative maps as a partisan
gerrymander, achieved via the exploitation of population deviations, comes from an examination of the relationship of the population deviations in the districts relative to the strength of the
Republican electorate in the districts. In Figure 1 these authors
plot the percentage of population deviation from the ideal for each
of the 180 seats in the Georgia House of Representatives in 2002,
against the proportion of votes cast for Republicans for PSC in
2004 (the diamond-shaped markers indicate each observed case).200
The coefficient of determination between the two variables is a respectable .348.201 When one plots the population deviation against
the probability of the district voting a majority Republican for PSC
in 2000 (the circle-shaped markers in Figure 1), the relationship is
197. Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1347.
198. Id. at 1338.
199. Id. at 1347-48.
200. See infra fig.1.
201. The coefficient of determination (multiple R-square) indicates the proportion
of variation in an interval-level dependent variable that is accounted for by controlling for the independent variables in a statistical model, in this case the general linear
model as applied through ordinary least squares regression. A value of 0 indicates no
explained variation, while a value of 1 (which is rarely observed) means that all of the
variation in values of the dependent variable is accounted for by the predictor variables in the model.
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FIGURE 1: POPULATION DEVIATIONS × %GOP FOR PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION, PROBABILITY OF A DISTRICT
VOTING MAJORITY GOP FOR PSC, IN 2000
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*At least one incumbent had previously announced plans to retire or seek other
office.

so strongly related to the size and direction of the district population deviation as to be nearly perfectly linear. The relationship affirms the partisan goal of the map. Democratic mapmakers set
what they viewed as a legally-defined ceiling on the population of a
district and then packed as many Republican voters as possible
into those districts in order to minimize the impact of Republican
voters on other districts. Democratic voters were spread across as
many districts as possible, set at the lowest possible population
floor in order to maximize their influence across districts. The
power of the relationship between district partisanship and population deviation affirms the presence of the strategy. The power and
significance of the relationship indicate it could not have happened
by chance, but rather had to be a product of design.
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Lawyers for the Democrats appealed the panel’s decision to the
U.S. Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment.202 Implementation of the state’s previous appellate victory in Ashcroft was forestalled. Georgia had to create new legislative districts in time for
the 2004 elections. Since filing for election in Georgia was scheduled for the last week of April, the trial court gave the legislature
less than three weeks, until March 1, to design replacement
plans.203
Despite the gerrymander designed to increase the Democratic
Party’s Senate contingent by five, Republicans took control of the
upper chamber after the 2002 election.204 Republicans passed a
new Senate redistricting plan in 2003 only to see it languish in a
House committee.205 After Larios, the Senate successfully enacted
a plan.206 In the past, each chamber had deferred to the other
when it came to districting its own chamber.207 Despite the court
order invalidating the existing maps, the House ignored the noninterference norm in 2004 as it had in the previous year.208
The House Legislative and Congressional Reapportionment
Committee not only balked at accepting the Senate plan, it never
released a plan for its own chamber.209 Although Democrats had a
sizable advantage, holding 107 of 180 seats, they doubted whether
they could hold their ranks and enact a plan.210 They feared that
Republicans would cut deals with enough rural, conservative Democrats to substitute a GOP alternative to any plan that the Democratic leadership offered.211
202. Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
203. Larios, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1356.
204. The Democratic gerrymander resulted in Democrats winning 30 of 56 Senate
seats—two fewer than before the election. Newly-elected Republican Governor
Sonny Perdue convinced four Democrats to change parties. Bullock, GOP Finally
Takes Over, supra note 11, at 68-69.
205. Jim Tharpe, Gridlock 2003? Time Is Passing But Bills Aren’t, ATLANTA J.CONST., Mar. 15, 2003, at A1.
206. Rhonda Cook, Mapmakers Uunveil Redistrict Lines Today, ATLANTA J.CONST., Mar. 15, 2004, at D4.
207. Brandon Larrabee, Senate Approves New Maps, Athens Banner Herald, Feb.
21, 2004, at A1, A4.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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When the legislature failed to act, the court appointed retired
federal judge Joseph Hatchett to serve as special master.212 The
judge, assisted by Professor of Law Nathaniel Persily, drew maps
for the General Assembly that had deviations of + 1%.213 The initial maps did not consider incumbency and, as reported in Table 3,
paired 66 representatives.214 In contrast with the Democratic map
that disproportionately paired Republicans, the court’s map paired
45 Democrats (40.4% of the Democratic caucus) along with 20
Republicans (30% of the GOP caucus) and the one Independent.215 A number of pairings occurred adjacent to districts that
had no incumbent.216 Ironically, the chair of the House Reapportionment Committee, who had refused to present a map, ended up
sharing a district with two of the House’s most powerful members,
the chairs of the Appropriations and Rules Committees.217 The
court’s first House map would have created 47 seats without incumbents.218 The Senate map would have created eleven open
seats with 20 paired senators.219
The court responded to numerous suggestions from the two political parties, and when a pairing could be undone with little difficulty and would not result in another pairing, the court approved
changes.220 Members of the LBC claimed that they had been singled out for pairing even though the new maps resulted in the same
number of majority-black districts as the maps being replaced.221
In the end, 33 House incumbents—20 Democrats, 12 Republicans,
212. Rhonda Cook, Court Redraws Capitol Careers, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 16,
2004, at A1.
213. Id.
214. See infra tbl. 3.
215. See infra tbl. 3.
216. Rhonda Cook, Attorneys Protest New District Maps, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar.
20, 2004, at E1 [hereinafter Cook, Attorneys Protest].
217. Jim Galloway, Power up for Grabs, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 17, 2004, at D1.
218. Rhonda Cook, Lawmakers Get One Last Shot to Pass Own Maps, ATLANTA
J.-CONST., Mar. 17, 2004, at D6.
219. Cook, Attorneys Protest, supra note 216, at E1, E3.
220. Tom Baxter & Jim Galloway, Put Those Muskets Down: The Devolution Has
Been Called on Account of Rain, ajc.com, Mar. 24, 2004, http://www.ajc.com/metro/
content/metro/insider/0304a/032404.html.
221. See Rhonda Cook, Democrats Stall Map Decision, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May
18, 2004, at D5 (discussing the argument that “pairing African-American lawmakers
with other legislators, especially other members of the black caucus, would be a step
back for minority constituencies.”). Of the 38 seats elected from majority black districts in 2002, 17 represented districts under-populated by more than 4% while only
seven had populations above the ideal. The geographic concentration of these districts contributed to the initial pairing of black incumbents elected from these
districts.
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TABLE 3: GEORGIA STATE HOUSE INCUMBENT PAIRINGS 2004
District* Paired Incumbents, 1st Map
149
G. Green (D) and Hugh Broome
(D)
B. Mitchell (D) and M. Henson
(D)
P. Smith (D) and B. Childers (D)
D. Wix (D) and A. Thomas (D)
57
D. Teper (D) and P. Gardner (D)
84
S. Benefield (D), J. McClinton (D)
and G. Maddox (D)
R. Teilet (D) and J. Noel (D)
T. Brooks (D) and B. Holmes (D)
K. Ashe (D) and D. Dean (D)
G. Sinkfield (D) and R. Dodson
(D)
92
P. Stephenson (D), S. Watson (D),
and T Greene-Johnson (D)
V. Hill (D) and D. Jordan (D)
J. Skipper (D) and D. Buckner
(D)
T. Buck (D), C. Smyre (D), and C.
Hugley (D)
161
L. Jackson (D) and M. Stephens
(D)
P. Houston (D) and J. Shaw (D)
34
D. Stoner (D) and R. Golick (D)
93
R. Sailor (D) and B. Bunn (D)
99
D. Casas (R), H. Floyd (D), and
C. Bannister (D)
146
L. Walker (D)* and L. O’Neal (R)
166
T. Barnard (R) and B. Oliver (D)
165
B. DeLoach (I) and A. Williams
(D)
B. Hanner (D) and E. Rynders
(R)
R. Forster (R) and R. Williams
(R)
7
J. White (R) and D. Ralston (R)
T. Knox (R) and J. Murphy (R)
18
M. Butler (R) and C. Harper (R)
M. Coan (R) and D. Sheldon (R)
17
B. Heath (R) and R. Maxwell (R)
D. Parsons (R) and M. Dollar (R)
M. Burkhalter (R) and T. Rice (R)

Paired Incumbents, 2d Map
G. Green (D) and Hugh Broome
(D)

D. Teper (D) and P. Gardner (D)
B. Mobley (D), J. McClinton (D)
and G. Maddox (D)*

P. Stephenson (D) and T GreeneJohnson (D)*

L. Jackson (D) and M. Stephens
(D)
P. Houston (D) and J. Shaw (D)
D. Stoner (D) and R. Golick (R)
R. Sailor (D) and B. Bunn (R)
C. Thompson (D) and H. Floyd
(D)*
L. Walker (D) and L. O’Neal (R)*
T. Barnard (R) and B. Oliver (D)
B. DeLoach (I) and A. Williams
(D)
R. Forster (R) and R. Williams (R)
J. White (R) and D. Ralston(R)*
M. Butler(R) and C. Harper(R)
B. Heath (R) and R. Maxwell (R)

*At least one incumbent had previously announced plans to retire or seek other office.
**Note: District numbers are included only for final pairings. The numbering of the initial,
proposed districts by the federal court’s special master did not conform to the final district
numbering, and included districts numbered only with letters or letters and numbers.
Source: Data compiled by authors.
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and the sole Independent—were paired as reported in Table 3.222
The final Senate plan paired two sets of Republicans, paired one
Democrat set, and created three districts that housed a Democrat
and a Republican. The new maps resulted in a number of open
seats, which boosted Republican hopes of winning a majority in the
House and thereby taking control of both branches of the Georgia
legislature.223
Judicial Finality
The final decision on the Georgia redistricting came on June 30,
2004, when the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
district court by an eight to one vote.224 Three of the justices
signed opinions. In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Stephen
Breyer, Justice John Paul Stevens strongly defended the principle
of one person, one vote, and reiterated the role of region and
party:
The District Court’s findings disclose two reasons for the unconstitutional population deviations in the state legislative reapportionment plans. The first was “a deliberate and systematic policy
of favoring rural and inner-city interests at the expense of suburban areas north, east, and west of Atlanta.” The second was “an
intentional effort to allow incumbent Democrats to maintain or
increase their delegation, primarily by systematically underpopualting the districts held by incumbent Democrats, by
overpopulating those of Republicans, and by deliberately pairing numerous Republican incumbents against one another.”225

Justice Stevens went on to list indicators of partisan shenanigans
that defied the traditional norms of “good government” redistricting principles—such as those we described in our discussion of
“fair” maps, above.226 Justice Stevens was not satisfied only to affirm the need for rigorous population equity, as was articulated in
Karcher and Reynolds, but proceeded to analyze ground debated
just weeks before in Vieth v. Jubelirer227:
222. See supra tbl. 3.
223. Brian Basinger, Judges OK New Districts, ATHENS BANNER HERALD, Mar. 26,
2004, at A1.
224. Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
225. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
226. Id. at 948-51; see also supra notes 14-48 and accompanying text. Justice Stevens would revisit these issues in his dissent in the final iteration of the Texas congressional redistricting case of the 2000s, see LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
227. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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[H]ad the Court in Vieth adopted a standard for adjudicating
partisan gerrymandering claims, the standard likely would have
been satisfied in this case. . . . [A]n impermissible partisan gerrymander is visible to the judicial eye and subject to judicially
manageable standards . . . Drawing district lines that have no
neutral justification in order to place two incumbents of the opposite party in the same district is probative of the same impermissible intent as the “uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure” that
defined the boundary of Tuskegee, Alabama in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot.228

Justice Stevens found oddly-shaped constituencies not only aesthetically offensive, but also, when combined with a political
agenda, legally offensive.229 Justice Stevens effectively invited additional challenges to redistricting plans on the basis of partisanship if the machinations of the sort used in the Georgia legislative
maps were at issue.
Larios undercut the notion of a + 5% safe harbor. Simply because it is possible to craft a map within a ten-point range of the
ideal population for districts, it does not follow that the map in
question will be legal, unless those deviations are justified by some
“neutral” public policy or pursuit of a neutral redistricting principle. If other courts embrace this element of the decision of the
Georgia district court—that population deviations within the tenpoint range must be justified by neutral principle or policy—then
jurisdictions must be prepared to explain population deviations
that had formerly gone largely un-scrutinized. The Court has
placed this one small constraint on the increasingly artistic, creative
maps of partisan political geographers, that they be as true as possible to equal population.
THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES

OF THE

2004 REMAP

The political consequences of the remap were far-reaching. In
the House, 26 Democratic incumbents did not compete in the general election, and another six lost reelection bids.230 In contrast,
Republicans reelected 63 of their 65 incumbents and dominated
the open seats, winning 28 of 37.231 When the dust of the November election settled, Democrats had lost a net of 21 seats, compared
228. Larios, 542 U.S. at 950 (Stevens, J. concurring) (internal citations omitted).
229. Id. at 948-49.
230. Cameron McWhirter, Republicans Run the Electoral Table, ATLANTA J.CONST., Nov. 4, 2004, at A1.
231. Id.
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to 22 gained by Republicans (added to the defeat of one Independent), leaving Republicans with a 95-85 majority in the House.232
In 2002, 136 incumbents ran in the general election: 87 of 107
Democrats (81.4%) and 49 of 72 Republicans (68.1%).233 In 2004,
143 incumbents stood in the general election: 81 of 109 Democrats
(74.3%) and 63 of 70 Republicans (88.5%).234
Republican House gains flowed partially from the redistricting
pairings in the federal court map. Of the 180 new SMDs, 65 hosted
one Republican incumbent, 85 had one Democratic incumbent,
four districts contained two Republican incumbents, six districts included two or more Democratic incumbents, and four districts
boasted an incumbent from each major party, though at least one
incumbent in each of these districts chose not to compete.235 At
least four Republican incumbents and seven Democratic incumbents would not return for the next session as a consequence of this
redistricting.236 The remaining districts were true open seats.237
The Senate plan had fewer pairings. Two pairings contained a
Democrat and Republican each.238 The problems, however, were
less significant than it might appear. Two of these representatives
left the state legislature to make runs at the U.S. Congress.239 The
nation’s longest serving state legislator, Hugh Gillis—who first won
a seat in the Georgia General Assembly in 1940—left public life.240
232. The majority would grow in the coming weeks as four South Georgia Democrats switched to the GOP, boosting its ranks to 99 of 180 seats. Nancy Badertscher,
Another House Democrat Joins GOP, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 10, 2004, at B4.
233. Compare Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia House of Representatives Election Results, Nov. 7, 2000, http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/election_results/2000_
1107/house.htm, with Georgia State House 2002 Election Results, supra note 88; compare Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia State Senate Election Results, Nov. 7, 2000,
http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/election_results/2000_1107/senate.htm, with Georgia State Senate 2002 Election Results, supra note 104.
234. Compare Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia House of Representatives Election Results, Nov. 2, 2004, http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/election_results/2004_
1102/house.htm [hereinafter Georgia State House 2004 Election Results], with Georgia State House 2002 Election Results, supra note 88; compare Georgia Secretary of
State, Georgia State Senate 2004 Election Results, Nov. 2, 2004, http://www.sos.state.
ga.us/elections/election_results/2004_1102/senate.htm, with Georgia State Senate 2002
Election Results, supra note 104.
235. See supra tbl. 3.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. (“Senate President pro-tem Eric Johnson (R-Savannah) against Rene
Kemp (D-Hinesville); and 59-year-old Jack Hill (R-Reidsville) against 85-year-old
Hugh Gillis (D-Soperton).”).
239. Id.
240. See Bill Torpy, Old Friends Clash in New District: Remap Pits Senators Against
Each Other, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 21, 2004, at A1.

R
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Thus, the only electoral pairing involved two Republicans.241 Ironically the loser in that match-up was a Democrat who had switched
parties in 2002 in order to give Republicans their Senate
majority.242
The Two-Incumbent Pairings
As reported in Table 4,243 three of the five districts that paired a
Democratic incumbent with a Republican had given at least 55%
of its votes to Democrats for the PSC in 2000, and were between
32% and 61% black VAP.244 The other two districts voted Republican for the PSC in 2000 and had black VAPs below 22 percent.
Republicans carried the two Republican-leaning districts and also
District 166, which had voted 55% for the Democrats for PSC in
2000.245
Democrats retained all six districts that contained two or more
Democratic incumbents.246 Democratic PSC candidates polled at
least 63% of the vote in these districts. In three districts in which
Epstein’s analysis projected that African-Americans could elect
their preferred candidate, an African-American candidate was
elected.247
The GOP prevailed in the four districts having two Republican
incumbents.248 Each district had voted Republican for the PSC in
2000, with three voting over 60% Republican.249 None of the districts had a black VAP above 17%, and one had only 0.19% black
VAP.250
241. See Georgia Secretary of State, Official Results of the July 20, 2004 Primary
Election, http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/election_results/2004_0720/senate.htm
(detailing defeat of Sen. Dan Lee by Sen. Seth Harp).
242. See Rhonda Cook, Election 2004: Legislative Primaries: 5 Incumbents Won’t
Return to Capitol, ATLANTA J.-CONST., July 22, 2004, at B3.
243. See infra tbl.4.
244. Computed by authors from data in tbl. 4, infra. Public Service Commission
contests are often viewed as providing a good perspective on the relative strength of
the two parties in a district, because PSC contests tend to attract little media coverage
and the candidates are not usually well known. Consequently, most voters in PSC
contests rely heavily on the party labels. Gaddie Expert Report, supra note 69, at 11.
245. See infra tbl.4.
246. See infra tbl.4.
247. Compare generally Expert Report of David Epstein, supra note 154, with
Georgia State House 2004 Election Results, supra note 234.
248. See Doug Gross, GOP Takes Control of G.A. House, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Nov. 3, 2004, at A4.
249. Computed by authors from data in tbl.5, infra.
250. See infra tbl.5.
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TABLE 4: DISTRICT PROFILES WHERE
INCUMBENTS WERE PAIRED
A. Bipartisan Pairings (n = 5)
District
34
93
146
165
166

Black VAP
21.26
61.54
18.13
45.59
32.55

PSC 2000
50.36
32.73
58.89
33.04
44.17

GOP Win?
Yes
No
Yes
No*
Yes

PSC 2000
34.65
12.40
31.81
36.54
35.69
31.87

GOP Win?
No
No
No
No
No
No

PSC 2000
61.38
60.79
51.48
68.42

GOP Win?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

B. Democrats - Only Pairings (n = 6)
District
57
84
92
99
149
161

Black VAP
8.52
71.97
58.92
25.51
43.22
56.39

C. Republicans - Only pairings (n = 4)
District
7
17
18
32

Black VAP
.19
5.93
16.92
8.08

*Pairing included independent Buddy DeLoach, who lost to incumbent Democrat Al Williams in
the general election. No Republican was included in this pairing.
Source: Expert report of Ronald K. Gaddie, supra note 67.

One-Incumbent Districts
Republicans retained 63 (96.9%) of the 65 districts having a single GOP incumbent.251 Incumbents sought reelection in 53 of
these very safe GOP constituencies.252 The average vote for the
PSC in 2000 in these districts was 61.3%, and the average VAP was
only 11.4% black.253
The 85 districts housing a single Democratic incumbent showed
more political volatility. Incumbents competed in 73 of these districts but Republicans prevailed in six.254 Republicans won another
7 of the 13 districts where Democratic incumbents retired.255 The
average Democratic vote for PSC in 2000 in districts with Demo251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See
See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra
infra

tbl.5.
tbl.5.
tbl 5.
tbl.5.
tbl.5.

R
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cratic incumbents was over 61%, and the average percentage black
VAP exceeded 40 percent.256
The Open Seats
Republicans captured 12 of the 15 open seats created by redistricting in 2004.257 On average these were very Republican districts, with a mean Republican PSC 2000 vote of 56.9% and an
average percentage black VAP of just 16.9%.258 Seven Republicans ran unopposed in the general election.259
In the absence of incumbents, Republicans dominated the 2004
Georgia House elections, winning 28 of the 37 open seats.260 Of
the 28 open seats won, 17 were taken without opposition from the
Democrats, and Republicans conceded just three open seats (all
majority-black VAP). Republicans won 11 of 17 contested open
seats.261
Descriptive Change: Black Population Concentrations
The court maps affected the distribution and concentration of
black voters. As indicated in Table 5, part A,262 the map rejected
by the federal court included 38 black-majority-VAP districts and
another ten districts which had 40-50% black VAP.263 These could
be assumed to be safely Democratic even if they did not elect the
black candidates of choice.264 Among the remaining districts, 82
were less than 20% black VAP and 50 were less than 10% black
VAP.265
The change in state legislative boundaries scattered the selective
packing and placement of black voters on the state legislative map.
As indicated in part B of Table 5, the court plan increased the number of districts less than 20% black VAP from 82 to eighty-nine.266
Majority-black VAP districts increased by one to 39, and the number of districts between 40% and 50% black VAP increased by
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

See infra tbl.5.
See infra tbl.5.
See infra tbl.5.
See infra tbl.5.
See infra tbl.5.
See infra tbl.5.
See infra tbl.5.
See infra tbl.5.
See generally EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, THE RISE OF SOUTHERN REPUBLICANS (2002); DAVID LUBLIN, THE REPUBLICAN SOUTH (2004).
265. Computed by authors from data presented in tbl. 5, infra.
266. See infra tbl.5.
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BY

HOUSE
A. 2002*

Winning Party:
N*
Dem
< 10%
50
5
10-20%
32
15
20-30%**
28
21
30-40%
22
20
40-50%
10
10
50-60%
20
20
60%+
18
18
B. 2004
Winning Party:
N
Dem
< 10%
52
7
10-20%
37
6
20-30%
22
11
30-40%****
18
10
40-50%
12
12
50-60%
18
18
60%+
21
21

GOP
45
17
6
2***
0
0
0

% GOP
90.0
53.1
21.4
9.1
0.0
0.0
0.0

GOP
45
31
11
8
0
0
0

%GOP
86.5
83.8
50.0
44.4
0.0
0.0
0.0

Net D from 2002
+2 total, +0 GOP
+5 total, +14 GOP
−6 total, +5 GOP
−4 total, +6 GOP
+2 total, +0 GOP
−2 total, +0 GOP
+3 total, +0 GOP

SENATE
C. 2002
< 10%
10-20%
20-30%**
30-40%
40-50%
50-60%++
60%+
D. 2004
< 10%
10-20%
20-30%**
30-40%
40-50%
50-60%++
60%+

Winning Party:
N*
Dem
17
1
5
2
9
3
12
8
0
8
7
5
5
Winning Party:
N*
Dem
15
0
10
0
10
2
7
6
1
1
10
10
3
3

GOP
16
3
6
4

% GOP
94.1
60.0
66.7
33.3

1
0

12.5
0.0

GOP
15
10
8
1
0
0
0

% GOP
100
100
80.0
16.7
0
0
0

*In 2002 180 seats were elected in 147 districts, including 66 seats elected in multimember
districts (“MMDs”). The “N” for each category represents the number of seats elected from a
category, rather than the number of districts (an MMD with three seats counts as three districts
with identical racial demographics).
**One seat was carried by independent Buddy DeLoach.
***Highest % black won by a Republican was 34.4%.
****Highest % black won by a Republican was 37.2%
++Highest % black won by a Republican was 51.5%
Source: Data compiled by authors.
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two.267 The number of districts between 20% and 30% black VAP
decreased by 6, while the number of 30-40% black VAP districts
decreased by four.268
Table 5 points out the strong structural role of race in determining the composition of the General Assembly. In 2002, Republicans won none of the 48 districts more than 40% black VAP but
carried 90% of the 50 districts that were less than 10% black.269
Republicans only won 23 of the 60 districts (38.3%) between 10%
to 30% black VAP, including just a bare majority (17 of 32 seats) of
districts with 10-20% black VAP.270 While Republicans came to
dominate congressional districts in the Deep South with less than
35% black VAP,271 it was only in overwhelmingly white areas that
Republicans dominated Georgia State House elections in 2002.272
The political impact of the shifts exceeds the demographic
changes. In 2004, Republicans continued to dominate districts that
were less than 10% black, winning 86.5% of these seats.273 A major change from 2002 was that Republicans did almost as well in
districts 10% to 20% black.274 They also took half the seats in 2030% black districts, and even won 44.4% of those 30-40% black.275
Redistricting created more constituencies that were favorable,
based on racial demographics, to Republicans than existed under
the old map, yet Republican gains exceeded the expectations given
previous GOP success in state legislative districts on the basis of
race.276
The linkage between the racial makeup of the district and partisanship is even more pronounced in the Senate, as shown in Table
5.277 Following the 2004 election, Republicans held 33 of 35 Senate
seats in districts less than 30% black VAP.278 In districts with
larger black concentrations, Democrats held all but one seat.279
267. See supra tbl.5.
268. See supra tbl.5.
269. See supra tbl.5.
270. See supra tbl.5.
271. See supra tbl.5.
272. See supra tbl.5.
273. See supra tbl.5.
274. See supra tbl.5.
275. See supra tbl.5.
276. The most likely source of Republican gains outside the redistricting effects is
the ongoing realignment of white Southern voters to the Republican Party. See
Charles S. Bullock III, Donna R. Hoffman & Ronald Keith Gaddie, The Consolidation of the White Southern Congressional Vote, 58 POL. RES. Q. 231, 240-41 (2005).
277. See supra tbl.5.
278. See supra tbl.5.
279. See supra tbl.5.
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The 2004 elections clearly divided Republican and Democratic
districts in terms of racial composition. But a comparison to the
previous election in 2002 reveals that the race-partisanship relationship was not as clearly defined in the recent past. While Table
5 shows Republicans winning 16 of 17 seats in districts that were
less than 10% black, they managed only to win approximately 64%
of seats in districts 10-30% black.280 Republicans did win four districts that were more than 30% black, and even won a majorityblack district seat by ousting the Senate majority leader.281 The
majority leader had become vulnerable after rumors of unethical
and even illegal behavior within his party—rumors that proved
true when a federal jury found him guilty of more than 100 criminal charges.282
Descriptive Change: Underlying Republican Partisanship
The changes in legislative boundaries also shifted the underlying
partisan makeup of the districts. Of the 180 State House districts
created in 2001, Table 6 shows that 78 voted Republican for the
PSC in 2000.283 PSC results indicate 42 competitive districts with
18 districts that cast 45-55% of their ballots for Democrats.284 The
GOP won 57 of the 60 most-Republican districts in 2002.285 Democrats won 74 of 78 districts that voted more than 55% Democratic
for PSC and all 47 of the safest Democratic districts.286 Only five
of 102 districts that voted Democratic for PSC sent a Republican to
the legislature in 2002.287
The 2004 map substantially altered the distribution of partisans
and the number of districts dominated by either party. With
Republicans no longer packed under the new map, 89 districts
voted Republican for the PSC.288 As shown in Table 6, Republi280. See supra tbl.5.
281. Mike Wynn, Numbers Tell Story of Walker’s Loss, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 7,
2002, at A-1.
282. James Salzer, Federal Prison Awaits Walker: Ex Legislator Gets Ten Years for
Fraud, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 30, 2005, at A1.
283. Data compiled by authors from tbl. 6, infra.
284. See infra tbl.6.
285. These were districts voting less than 45% Democratic for the PSC in 2000. See
Georgia Secretary of State, Official Results of the November 7, 2000 General Election, http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/election_results/2000_1107/default (follow
hyperlinks on left side for results of contests for Public Service Commission, seats 1
and 2).
286. These districts voted over 60% Democratic for PSC. Id.
287. Compare id., with Georgia State House 2002 Election Results, supra note 88.
288. See infra tbl.6.
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TABLE 6: DEMOCRATIC TENDENCY OF DISTRICTS,
PSC2000 VOTE, 2002 AND 2004
A. 2002 Winning Party:
N
Dem
< 40%
51
3
40-45%
9
0
45-50%
18
9
50-55%
24
23
55-60%
31
27
>60%
47
47
B. 2004
< 40%
40-45%
45-50%
50-55%
55-60%
>60%

Winning Party:
N
Dem
52
1
22
1
15
6
23
14
16
12
53
52

GOP
48
9
0 8*
1
4
0

%GOP
94.1
100.0
44.4
4.2
12.9
0.0

GOP
51
21
9
9
4
1

%GOP
98.1
95.5
60.0
39.1
25.0
18.9

Net D from 2002
+1 total, +3 GOP
+13 total, +12 GOP
−3 total, +1 GOP
−1 total, +8 GOP
−15 total, +0 GOP
−6 total, +1 GOP

*One district was carried by independent Buddy DeLoach.
Source: data for 2002 from Expert report of Ronald K. Gaddie, supra note 67; data for 2004
compiled by authors.

R

cans dominated GOP-leaning districts, winning 72 of 74 districts
where their PSC candidates got at least 45% of the vote and nine
of 15 districts that had narrowly backed the GOP for PSC.289 GOP
wins in districts that voted Democratic for PSC increased from five
to fourteen.290
Multivariate Analysis
The court’s 2004 redistricting was incumbent-neutral, but its
more compact districts redistributed Democratic voters so as to
create opportunities for Republicans. In contrast, the Democratic
redistricting strategy in 2001 distributed black voters, other Democrats, and incumbents so as to maximize their prospects while minimizing Republican incumbency effects and conceding a minimum
number of districts packed with Republicans.291 The factors that
guided the Democrats’ efforts can be represented by a set of five
variables. Party potential is measured by the vote in the 2000 Public Service Commission elections. Two PSC seats were contested in
2000.292 The second element, minority voter concentration, is mea289.
290.
291.
292.
2000.

See infra tbl.6.
See infra tbl.6.
See supra notes 95-113 and accompanying text.
Patricia M. LaHay, Incumbents Win PSC Seats, MACON TELEGRAPH, Nov. 8,
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sured by the percent black VAP and the percent Latino VAP (respectively) in each district. Incumbency is measured using a pair of
dichotomous variables, one each to indicate the presence or absence of a Republican or Democratic incumbent.
Table 7293 shows two estimates of the Republican share of the
vote in contested House districts. In the first estimate (part A), the
2000 PSC vote and controls for the presence of Democratic and
Republican incumbents are introduced.294 The second estimate retains the incumbency controls along with controls for the black and
Latino voting age populations (part B).295 The racial controls and
the PSC 2000 vote are not included in the same model because
black VAP is highly correlated with the PSC vote at the district
level (adjusted-R2 = .85).296 The analysis reveals a strong correlation between partisanship in the closely contested, low-profile PSC
contests and the vote for House members in 2002.297 Both analyses
show that incumbency acts in the expected directions but with the
impact of a Democratic incumbent about twice that of a Republican incumbent.298 The strategic placement of Democratic incumbents and the elimination of Republican incumbent contenders
could affect the expected vote distribution by four to seven points,
controlling for base partisanship.
The same models are estimated for 2004 (Table 7, parts C and
D). The 2004 model is as robust as in 2002. The most notable
change is in the effect of incumbency. In 2002, the impact of Democratic incumbency was twice that of Republican incumbency in
both regression estimates.299 In other words, Democrats got twice
the electoral benefit of placing their incumbents in a district than
Republicans got from the presence in an election of a GOP incumbent. The Republican and Democratic slopes in 2004 are of
roughly the same magnitude though in opposite directions—Democratic and Republican incumbents had about the same impact on
the vote for their respective parties, with Democratic incumbents
enhancing the Democratic vote and Republican incumbents diminishing the Democratic vote.300 The slope coefficient for PSC is
somewhat attenuated (b = .833 in 2004 as opposed to b = 1.106 in
293.
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TABLE 7: PARTISAN, RACIAL, AND INCUMBENCY INFLUENCES
IN GEORGIA HOUSE ELECTIONS
Contested seats in 2002
A.
Intercept
PSC 2000
Dem. Incumbent
Rep. Incumbent
Adjusted R2
N

B
−2.007
1.106
−7.048
3.978
.835
71

s.e.b
3.726
.072
1.617
2.099

t
−.539
15.277***
−4.358***
1.895*

Intercept
Dem. Incumbent
Rep. Incumbent
% Black VAP
% Latino VAP
Adjusted R2
N

B
68.466
−10.230
4.996
−.557
−.365
.668
71

s.e.b
3.048
2.378
3.013
.061
.218

t
22.463
−4.302***
1.658*
−9.103***
−1.680*

B.

Contested Seats in 2004
C.
Intercept
PSC 2000
Dem. Incumbent
Rep. Incumbent
Adjusted R2
N

B
12.089
.833
−7.546
6.704
.785
71

s.e.b
5.336
.100
2.334
2.566

t
2.265*
8.348***
−3.233**
2.613**

Intercept
Dem. Incumbent
Rep. Incumbent
% Black VAP
% Latino VAP
Adjusted R2
N

B
65.166
−9.863
10.971
−.409
−.315
.702
71

s.e.b
2.818
2.703
2.971
.076
.129

t
23.127
−3.649***
3.693***
−5.380***
−2.443**

D.

***p < .001
**p < .01
*p < .05
Source: Electoral data are from Expert Report of Ronald K.
Gaddie, supra note 67; racial and ethnic are from US Census;
incumbency data compiled by authors.

2002)—for every percentage point Republican for PSC in 2000, the
GOP vote for the legislature went up 1.106 points in 2002, but in
2004 the translation of a percentage point Republican for the PSC
only resulted in a .886 point increase in the GOP vote for the legis-
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lature.301 In the racial analysis, the slope for black VAP is somewhat attenuated but still highly significant.302
In Table 8303 the dependent variable is whether a Republican
won the district’s House seat in 2002. The political, racial, and incumbency variables are initially tested separately on the outcome
of interest—whether the GOP wins a seat—in the first three columns of the table, and then the five variables are combined into a
single estimate in the fourth column.304 Finally, a reduced, combined model that eliminates insignificant predictors appears in the
last column of the table. The 2002 election outcomes were strongly
structured by the underlying partisanship of the district and by the
presence of a Democratic incumbent.305 The political model in Table 8 reveals that the PSC 2000 vote alone reduced 80% of the
predictive error in determining which party won a district.306 The
racial/ethnic variables alone reduced the predictive error by 60%,
though only black VAP was statistically significant.307 Incumbency
controls reduced the predictive error by just over 47 percent.308
When the five variables are combined in a single estimate, only the
PSC vote and the presence of a Democratic incumbent significantly
affected the party winning the seat, though the predictive error reduction is less than for the PSC variable alone.309 The combined
two-variable model reduced the predictive error by 89 percent.310
The 2004 elections were also determined in part by the underlying partisanship of the district. The PSC vote alone reduced the
predictive error in who won a state House seat by 79%—if one
were to try to determine the share of cases where one would not
predict the result right based on chance, and then determined how
many of those we were able to predict correctly based on knowing
the PSC vote in the district, the proportion of incorrect predictions
would be reduced by 79 percent. Knowledge of only racial/ethnic
variables in Table 9311 reduced the predictive error by about 65%,
though again black VAP is the only significant predictor.312
301.
302.
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TABLE 8: LOGISTIC REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF PARTY WINNING
SEAT, 2002 GEORGIA HOUSE
Political
Model
Constant
PSC 2000
Black % VAP
Latino % VAP
Inc. Democrat
Inc. Republican
log-likelihood
null prediction
% Correct
Prediction
PRE

−14.812
.279***

Racial/
Ethnic
Model

Incumbency
Model

Combined
Model

2.991

−.000

−8.721
.189**
.045
.001
−1.538*
.544
77.354
61.11%
91.67%

−1.596**

.654

.894

−.157***
−.064

85.59
61.11%
92.22%

121.655
61.11%
84.44%

−2.436***
1.634**
87.257
61.11%
79.44%

.800

.600

.471

Reduced,
Combined
Model
−12.149
.243***

79.361
61.11%
92.22%

n = 180
***p < .001
**p < .01
*p < .05
+p < .10
Source: Electoral data are from Expert Report of Ronald K. Gaddie, supra note 67; racial and
ethnic are from US Census; incumbency data compiled by authors.

Knowledge of where incumbents from each party ran reduced predictive error by 80 percent.313 And, when one has knowledge of all
five variables, the incumbency and partisanship variables are statistically significant—the relationships likely do not exist by chance—
and the predictive error is reduced by 89%;314 eliminating Latino
VAP results in black population attaining significance in the reduced, combined model.315 In other words, of the possible mistakes
one might make in guessing at a result in ignorance, nearly nine out
of ten guessing mistakes can be avoided by knowing the partisanship, incumbency, and ethnic and racial composition of the
districts.
How much of the Democrats’ undoing is a product of the courtordered remap? As a check on the impact of redistricting, these
authors used the results of the regression analyses for 2002 to estimate expected GOP vote shares for each district in 2004. The authors first estimated GOP vote shares for all 180 seats in 2002,
based on the racial or partisan data for those districts and the cir-

313. See infra tbl.9.
314. See infra tbl.9.
315. See infra tbl.9.
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TABLE 9: LOGISTIC REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF PARTY WINNING
SEAT, 2004 GEORGIA HOUSE
Political
Model
Constant
PSC 2000
Black % VAP
Latino % VAP
Inc. Democrat
Inc. Republican
log-likelihood
null prediction
% Correct
prediction
PRE

−13.424***
.276***

Racial/
Ethnic
Model

Incumbency
Model

Combined
Model

3.162

1.123

−21.765
.417***
.090
.010
−2.283*
4.901**
48.541
52.78%
95.00%

−2.313**
4.953**
48.560
52.78%
95.00%

.894

.894

−.116***
−.031

88.24
52.78%
90.00%

137.29
52.78%
83.33%

−3.764***
3.370*
90.177
52.78%
90.56%

.788

.647

.800

Reduced,
Combined
Model
−21.445
.413***
.088*

n = 180
***p < .001
**p < .01
*p < .05
+p < .10
Source: Electoral data are from Expert Report of Ronald K. Gaddie, supra note 67; racial and
ethnic are from US Census; incumbency data compiled by authors.

cumstance of incumbency in the election.316 The estimates from
Table 7, part A—the PSC 2000 vote with incumbency controls—
indicated an expected result in 2002 of 74 GOP seats and 106 Democratic seats.317 The estimates from Table 7, part B—the racial
demographics with incumbency controls—predicted 83 GOP seats
and 97 Democratic seats for 2002.318
Applying the regression equation results for 2002 to the data and
incumbency circumstances for 2004 indicates the substantial impact
of redistricting on the political balance in the Georgia House.
Republicans were projected to win 92 districts based on the PSC
2000/incumbency model; the racial/incumbency model predicted
102 GOP and 78 Democratic seats.319 Of the 92 seats predicted to
go to Republicans by the PSC 2000/incumbency model for 2002, 86
316. See RONALD KEITH GADDIE & CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III, ELECTIONS TO
OPEN SEATS IN THE U.S. HOUSE: WHERE THE ACTION IS 1-12 (2000) (noting the
theory and methodology on applying these models); see generally J. Morgan Kousser,
Estimating the Partisan Consequences of Redistricting Plans—Simply, 21 LEG. STUD.
Q. 521 (1996).
317. Seventy-three Republicans, 106 Democrats, and one Independent won election. See Georgia State House 2002 Election Results, supra note 88; see, e.g., Larry
Hartstein, Election 2002, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 7, 2002, at J1.
318. See supra tbl.7.
319. Computed from data in tbl.7, supra.
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did in fact elect a Republican; of the 102 seats expected to elect a
Republican in 2004 based on the racial/incumbency model for 2002,
91 did so.320 If we assume Republicans won every district in which
either regression equation predicted a GOP majority, then we
made 91 correct predictions and 16 incorrect predictions, which
means the authors were 85% successful. Four districts expected to
vote Democratic elected Republicans and 12 expected to vote Republican chose Democrats.321
Taking the analysis a step further, eliminating incumbency influence by suppressing it to zero when applying the equations from
Table 7, parts A and B provide a feel for the role of incumbency in
promoting Democratic control of the House. In 2002, Democrats
retained the lower chamber based largely on the creative placement of core Democrats (especially minority voters), and the
power of Democratic incumbents.322 According to estimated vote
shares from the equation in Table 7, part A and holding incumbency to zero (assuming all contested, open seats), in 2002 Republicans and Democrats should have each taken 90 seats in the lower
chamber.323 The estimates from the racial model—Table 7, part
B— indicate a Republican advantage in 101 districts.324
Democrats face weakened prospects under the new map. When
incumbents are removed from the equations as applied to the map
for 2004, the regression estimates indicate that Republicans would
be expected to win 103 districts, based on the PSC 2000 equation in
Table 7, part A, and expected to win 113 districts based on the
racial equation.325 Thus, a shift of between 10 and 13 seats from
Democrats to the Republicans occurred as a result of redistricting,
laying aside the secondary effects of incumbency.
CONCLUSION
Georgia’s 2001 redistricting has been identified as an example of
political creativity that pushed the envelope of redistricting technology and the law in pursuit of political advantage.326 Nearly
every convention of redistricting was set aside. In order to imple320. See supra tbl.7.
321. See supra tbl.7.
322. See Gelman and King, supra note 68, at 553 (discussing incumbency advantage); see also Gaddie Expert Report, supra note 69, at 21.
323. See supra tbl.7.
324. See supra tbl.7.
325. See supra tbl.7.
326. MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN
POLITICS 454 (2003).
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ment their initial plan, Democrats took the unusual step of pursuing judicial review for preclearance under the Voting Rights Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court ignored its long-established definition of
retrogression in order to uphold Georgia’s actions. Ultimately the
map was undone by the state’s inability to justify seemingly legal
population deviations to the satisfaction of the courts.
The defects in Georgia’s legislative maps illustrate how far a
party that has lost public favor will go in an effort to retain power.
The Democrats’ desperation may have derived from their unfamiliarity with the minority role—a status Georgia Democrats had not
experienced since 1872.327 Once a court redrew the state’s districts
to meet de minimus population deviations, while observing traditional redistricting criteria, the carefully-crafted political advantages of the gerrymander came undone. The court knocked the
tripod of the gerrymander—strategic placement of Democratic incumbents and the strategic dislocation of Republican incumbents,
together with the careful placement of black and Democratic voters, respectively, and the packing of Republican voters into few,
homogenous districts—out from under the Democratic majority in
the General Assembly.
The litigation spawned by the Georgia redistricting is politically
and legally significant. The political significance is self-evident, because it disrupted the political strategy designed to continue the
control of a party that had lost its popular majority. The threejudge panel in the northern district of Georgia, which sought to
minimize the detrimental effects on incumbents to the greatest extent possible while crafting a neutral-principles map, nonetheless
denied Democrats a sufficient number of incumbents and attractive districts in which to run. This analysis indicates that Democrats have not yet reached bottom in the state House.328 They
could conceivably fall to just over one-third of seats based on the
alignment of current districts and the continuing trend of realignment among white voters toward the Republican Party.329
The larger legal question of whether the judiciary should intervene in partisan gerrymanders was not resolved by Larios. From a
legal standpoint, however, the Georgia remap can serve as a poten327. See Bullock, GOP Finally Takes Over, supra note 11, at 70.
328. In 2006 Republicans had a net gain of two House seats. Compare Georgia
Secretary of State, Georgia State House of Representatives Election Results, Nov. 7,
2006, http://www.sos.state.ga.us/elections/election_results/2006_1107/swgahouse.htm,
with Georgia State House 2004 Election Results, supra note 234.
329. See generally Bullock, Hoffman, & Gaddie, supra note 276.
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tial roadmap for the courts to assess and rectify partisan gerrymanders. Justice Breyer stated that the evidence of partisan bias
displayed by the Georgia maps demonstrated that a gerrymander is
“visible to the judicial eye” and the Georgia map would meet the
standards of an illegal gerrymander according to the minority’s
standard in the Vieth case.330 The three-judge panel in the Northern District for the District of Georgia has shown the propriety of a
neutral-principles map, at least in this case, as a solution to a partisan gerrymander. The compact, incumbent-neutral map (in which
the court nonetheless took pains to retroactively uncouple many
paired incumbents) resulted in the party that won a majority of
votes getting a majority of seats.331 In the Senate, the new plans
finally enabled Republicans to get the kind of bonus usually enjoyed by the party that wins a majority of the popular vote.332
Not all of the Republican gains in Georgia in 2004 are a product
of redistricting, however, the analysis presented here indicates that
roughly half of the gains by Republicans can be attributed to the
placement of incumbents and the change in partisan and racial
composition of the legislative districts. The remaining gains are
likely the product of other political forces, long held in check by
the efforts of the declining Democratic legislative majority. As
demonstrated in this Article, federal judges acting in a non-partisan manner produced significant partisan changes in Georgia.333
Yet, a federal three-judge panel in Texas, charged with redrawing
the Texas congressional districts in 2001, came to a very different
result.334 The Texas redistricting plan drew the two districts gained
by the state as a result of its rapid population growth to have a
Republican majority.335 Even with the two additional Republican
districts, the Texas congressional delegation continued to be predominately Democratic, with the Democrats having a 17 to 15 ad-

330. See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 950 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).
331. Republican State House candidates garnered 57% of the votes in 2004 and
won 53% of seats. See supra tbl.1.
332. Republicans presently hold 34 of 56 Senate seats. See The Georgia State Senate, Members by Name, http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2007_08/senate/senatelist.
php (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
333. See supra notes 212-223.
334. Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 WL 35673968, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Nov.
14, 2001).
335. Id.
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vantage.336 The popular voting in Texas, like in Georgia, was
predominately Republican at the end of the 20th century.337
How did such different results come about when both plans were
drawn by federal courts that sought to avoid conferring a partisan
advantage? The two courts came to different results because they
began at different places. The Larios court began by instructing
the special master to fill in a blank map, without considering where
incumbents lived.338 It appears that the court did instruct the special master to ensure that the number of majority-black districts
not be reduced in either the House or Senate plans.
The Baldares court approached its task much as the federal district court for the Southern District of Georgia had in Miller v.
Johnson, when it removed traces of the illegal racial gerrymandering of Georgia’s congressional districts in the mid-1990s.339 As the
Georgia court explained its subsequent actions, it went back to the
last legal districting plan which it used as its baseline and made
minimal changes from that plan.340 The Baldares court first drew
the two districts that had elected African-Americans and then drew
the districts that had elected Hispanics to Congress.341 Next, the
court placed the two new districts that Texas received as a result of
reapportionment into areas of the state that had experienced the
most rapid growth during the 1990s.342 Then the court sought to fit
the district of the current incumbents around what they had already been placed on the map so as to give all incumbents districts
they could reasonably expect to win.343 Consequently, the effects
of the Democratic gerrymander drawn under the watchful eye of
Rep. Martin Frost a decade earlier continued to influence the 2002
elections.344 As a result, Republicans received 55% of the popular
336. BARONE & COHEN, supra note 326, at 11.
337. CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III & RONALD K. GADDIE, AN ASSESSMENT OF VOTING RIGHTS PROGRESS IN TEXAS (Am. Enterprise Inst. Policy Series, 2005), available
at http://www.aie.org/publications/pubID.23863/pub_detail.asp (follow link to study in
pdf format).
338. Rhonda Cook, Voting Maps to be Redrawn, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 23,
2004, at B4.
339. See generally Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
340. See generally Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997).
341. Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 WL 35673968, at *5-6 (E.D. Tex. Nov.
14, 2001).
342. The court explained that it approached the problem in such a manner because
Texas is subject to the Voting Rights Act. Id.
343. BARONE & COHEN, supra note 326, at 1511.
344. Id. at 1510-11; see also supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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congressional vote in Texas in 2002, but managed to win only 47%
of the seats.345
The approach taken by the Larios district court—ignoring the
most recent legal plan to instead institute a de novo map—breaks
with what had been done by district courts in Georgia and Texas
during the previous decade when correcting problems due to racial
gerrymandering. Had the Balderes district court followed the approach of the Larios judges, Texas might have received a congressional map where Republicans won a share of seats in line with the
majority of the vote, which their party had been winning beginning
in 1994. Had the Balderas court designed a plan under which
Republicans won 55% of the seats, Republicans would have enjoyed an 18 to 14 advantage and Rep. Tom DeLay might have had
less incentive to embark upon the mid-decade redistricting that
produced new congressional districts in 2003.

345. See Texas Legislative Council, District Election Analysis, 2002 General Election, http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/redist/pdf/c1440_2002General.pdf.

